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Abstract
This article shows how protections for civil defendants arguably exceed protections for criminal defendants, and considers some constitutional and practical implications of this ongoing shift.
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I.

INTRODUCTION: THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL SYSTEMS

The broad differences between criminal and civil actions are well
understood.1 First, a civil action is typically brought by a plaintiff, whereas a
criminal action is brought by the state.2 Second, the typical civil remedy are
*
The author thanks his mentors: Professors Richard Epstein, William
Landes, Murray Dry, Russel Leng, Elizabeth M. Penn, and John W. Patty. In addition, the
author thanks the faculties of Law and Economics at the Lahore School of Management
Sciences. Many thanks also to the editors of the Nova Law Review for their excellent work
on editing the piece. For excellent research assistance, the author is grateful to Ms. Fatima
Wahla.
1.
See DAVID D. FRIEDMAN, LAW8S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO DO
WITH LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS 289 (2000).
2.
Id.; ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 458 (6th ed.
2012). R^1 o WO(OL +)O* *PT .LoO1*OSS O+ o .,O(o*T O1VO(OV)oL—the victim. In a criminal
prosecution the plaintiff is society as represented by the public prosecutor or attorney
QT1T,oLe< COOTER & ULEN, supra.

Published by NSUWorks, 2018

1

Nova Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 2

180

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

damages awarded to the plaintiff, whereas typical criminal remedies are a
fine to the state or imprisonment.3 Third, civil damages are generally
compensatory and meant to make the plaintiff whole—that is, indifferent to
the wrong done—whereas criminal penalties are neither compensatory, nor
equal to the harm caused.4 Fourth, criminal litigants always have legal
expertise, with the state prosecutor on one side and guaranteed defense
counsel on the other, whereas civil litigants must pay for legal representation
and may forego it.5 Fifth, criminal defendants have a right to a jury, whereas
civil defendants generally do not.6 Sixth, people accused of crimes have
broader rights to withhold unfavorable information and receive favorable
information from the prosecutor than civil defendants do.7 Seventh,
crimes—unlike civil wrongs—usually have an intent element.8 And finally,
the civil burden of proof at trial is lower than the criminal one.9
There is an impression that the criminal process is more exacting for
the claimant and more favorable to the defendant than the civil process.10

289.

3.

COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 459U60; FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at

4.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra 10*T Jf o* HFce R!03.T1+o*O01 O1 WO(OL Lom
oO3+ *0 ,T+*0,T *PT (OW*O38+ mTLSo,T o* *PT Tk.T1+T 0S *PT O1N),T,e @)nishment in criminal law
makes the injurer worse off without directly benefiting the victi3e< Id.
5.
See Nancy Leong, Gideon’s CaN-Protective Function, 122 YALE L.J.
2460, 2476 (2013); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51
STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1505 (1999).
Criminal trials have several characteristics that render appointed counsel
appropriate. First, the government is not only a litigant, but also the employer of
many of the witnesses—for example, law enforcement officers—whom it calls at
trial. Second, the government supplies the attorney to argue for its position, which
inherently means that the advantage in terms of resources, institutional knowledge,
and credibility usually lies with the prosecution. Third, the subject of litigation
involves immense power disparities between the individual and the government—
that is, the individual is simply no match for the government at any stage leading up
to a criminal proceeding, ranging from the earliest stages of investigation to the
303T1* 0S o,,T+*e a0),*Pf O1 W,O3O1oL Wo+T+f *PT Q0(T,13T1*8+ .0+O*O01 O+ O1PTrently
always represented. Fifth and finally, the evidence of abusive behavior by law
enforcement officers throughout our criminal justice system renders counsel
particularly appropriate when the circumstances leading to the litigation involve law
enforcement.

Leong, supra, at 2476UEE hS00*10*T+ 03O**TVge R#10*PT, n)* W0nsistent way to explain the
difference between the criminal and civil burdens of proof is by reference to the inherent
oV(o1*oQT+ 0S *PT .,0+TW)*O01 O1 o W,O3O1oL Wo+T e e e e< @0+1T,f supra, at 1505.
6.
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432 (1995).
8.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 288.
9.
Id.
10.
See NAT8L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, CIVIL JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS OF
CRIME
6U7
(2001)
http://www.victimsofcrime.org/docs/Public%20Folders/Civil%20Justice%20%20FINAL%20(non-book).pdf?sfvrsn=0; Robert F. Kennedy, Law Day Address, 13 U. CHI.
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This view is based on constitutional protections provided explicitly to the
criminal defendant and not to the civil one.11 The view is apparently
confirmed when we observe a defendant prevailing against a criminal claim
and failing against a corresponding civil claim. 12 The purpose of this Article
is to challenge this wisdom.* It will be argued that the criminal claimant—
the state—is not more encumbered than the civil one, and though there are
practical reasons for this, the low thresholds for criminal prosecution seem to
conflict with the constitutional scheme.*
Civil protections in aggregate may well be greater than criminal
protections.13 This is reasonable enough, since the prosecutor of a criminal
claim typically has weaker incentives to invest in the legal process, and often
lower resources, than a private plaintiff does.14 If the benefits from a
criminal case were lower, and the costs higher than in the corresponding civil
case, then criminal prosecution could go the way of the dodo.15 Whether that
would be a good or a bad thing is unclear.16 Briefly, we consider some
arguments for the coexistence of the two systems: First, some cases involve
positive externalities, where a civil claimant would not find it worthwhile to
bring a case, but society as a whole would be better off if the case were
pursued;17 however, this could explain why the state might bring a case, but
not why that case would be criminal rather than civil.18 Second, in some
cases, the offender is judgment proof—that is, too resource-constrained to be
able to pay large damages—and therefore, unresponsive to the threat of a
hefty damages award; however, if this were decisive, then the only difference
L. SCH. REC.f 6O1*T, KCFGf o* JHf JFe R6T Po(T +TW),TV *PT oW-)Ottal of an indigent person—
but only to abandon him to eviction notices, wage attachments, repossession of goods and
termination of welfare beneSO*+e< [T11TVjf supra, at 26.
11.
See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI.
12.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 281. A prominent example is the criminal
acquittal versus civil liability for O.J. Simpson. Id.
13.
See NAT8L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES, supra note 10, at 6U7.
14.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 286; Posner, supra note 5, at 1505; Steve
Schmadeke, -19Pic Defen$er; +tate’s 4ttorneJ ,aise 4Par8 49o1t +teep Cook County Budget
Cuts,
CHI.
TRIB.
(Oct.
23,
2017,
5:45PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-met-cook-county-states-attorney-foxxbudget-cuts-20171023-story.html.
15.
See First Estimates of Judicial Costs of Specific Crimes, from Homicide to
Theft, RAND CORP. (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.rand.org/news/press/2016/09/12.html;
Schmadeke, supra note 14.
16.
See Steven Shavell, The Social Versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit
in a Costly Legal System, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 334, 336 (1982).
17.
See id. o* IIHf IIFe Rq_pOQP LTQoL Tk.T1+T+ 0S .LoO1*OSSf L0m Tk.T1+T+ 0S
defendants, a low level of loss, [and] a large reduction in net expected losses due to liability
tend[] to increase the likelihood that there will not be [a private] suit when it would be socially
VT+O,onLTe< Id. at 336.
18.
See id. at 334, 336.
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between criminal and civil actions would be the penalties and not the
procedural or substantive rules.19 Third, the criminal process may exist
because, in solving the two previous problems, the law faces the possible
collusion of investigators, prosecutors, and judges when all of these roles are
played by the government; this possibility could explain both the existence of
the criminal system and more exacting rules—such as jury involvement,
.)nLOWO*jf Q)o,o1*TTV VTST1+Tf *PT VTST1Vo1*8+ +.TWOoL ,OQP*+f o1V o POQPT,
burden of proof.20 It is still arguable that collusion, externalities, and
judgment proofness problems could be solved by subsidizing a private
.LoO1*OSS8+ Wo+Tf 0, nj 0SST,O1Q *PT .LoO1*OSS +03T ,Tmo,Vf ,o*PT, *Po1 T,TW*O1Q
an entire parallel system of justice so that the case for criminal law remains
vulnerable.21 Indeed, such an alternative system may have supplanted
criminal law if criminal prosecution were, in fact, more challenging than a
civil suit, as the Constitution seems to demand.22 However, assuming that
the criminal process is worth preserving for social or political purposes, it
will be argued that it is sustained, in part, by the constitutionally problematic
relative ease of pursuing criminal prosecution versus a civil suit.23
;PT Q0(T,13T1*8+ O1centives in pursuing a criminal charge may be
mToMT, *Po1 o .,O(o*T .LoO1*OSS8+ Oncentives in a corresponding civil suit; the
successful private plaintiff will typically receive damages that make her
whole, whereas a successful prosecution results in a penal sanction that may
be of lesser value to the prosecutor.24 There are two reasons for this: First,
some portion of a penal sanction often serves to stigmatize or incapacitate
the defendant rather than redistribute value; and such a sanction is of limited
(oL)T *0 *PT .,0+TW)*0,8+ 0SSOWTe25 Second, even if part of the criminal
sanction is monetary, or even granting that stigma, and incapacitation of the
defendant does provide utility, that utility is not captured entirely by the
.,0+TW)*0,8+ 0SSOWTf n)* O+ distributed across society.26 While the private
plaintiff can expect to internalize most of the benefit of a successful claim, a
prosecutor is unlikely to internalize the entire benefit of a successful

19.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 282U83; Shavell, supra note 16, at 334.
20.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; FED. R. CRIM. P. 23; In re Winship, 397 U.S.
358, 361 (1970); FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 289, 291; Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Problems
Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal Proceedings, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12U13 (1961).
21.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 282U83, 291; Shavell, supra note 16, at
334.
22.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, VII; FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 286.
23.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 289, 291; Leong, supra note 5, at 2462.
24.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 460; Shavell, supra note 16, at 334.
25.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 459U60.
26.
See id.
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prosecution.27 It folL0m+ *Po* o .,0+TW)*0,8+ O1WT1*Oves in pursuing a criminal
Wo+T mOLL 0S*T1 nT mToMT, *Po1 o WO(OL .LoO1*OSS8+ O1 .),+)O1Q o .,ivate claim.28
Compounding the effect of weaker incentives is often the
.,0+TW)*0,8+ lowest resource.29 It has been observed that prosecutor
workloads in some jurisdictions are so heavy to virtually ensure
malpractice.30 While the civil plaintiff is also resource constrained—and
while the mismatch between a well-heeled civil defendant and plaintiff can
be starker than that between criminal litigants—the civil plaintiff typically
has more control over her caseload, and is unlikely to take on multiple court
appearances a day or hundreds of cases in a year.31
Admittedly, this incentives story is complicated by the fact that
while the prosecutor does not reap the entire benefit of a prosecution, she
also does not bear its full cost.32 Absent a statutory or contractual provision,
the successful plaintiff still bears the costs of litigation, whereas the
prosecu*0,8+ W0+*+ o,T n0,1T nj *PT Q0(T,13T1*e33 There are two reasons for
*PT .,0+TW)*0,8+ L0mT, W0+*+B aO,+*f *PT W0+*+ 0S W,O3O1oL O1(T+*OQo*O01+ o,T
borne primarily by law enforcement agencies.34 Second, agency costs—that
is, the costs of shirking or monitoring incurred by a principal because of her
oQT1*8+ VO(T,QT1* O1Wentives—are also lower for the prosecutor than for a
private plaintiff, because the prosecutor is effectively acting for her own
office under her own budget, rather than for a client.35 Nevertheless, the
heavy caseL0oV o1V LO3O*TV n)VQT* 0S *PT .,0+TW)*0,8s office may overwhelm
these cost advantages.36

27.
See id. at 458U60; Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State
(Never) Rests: How Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW.
U. L. REV. 261, 287 (2011); Posner, supra note 5, at 1505.
28.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 458U60; Gershowitz & Killinger,
supra note 27, at 264; Posner, supra note 5, at 1505.
29.
See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 27, at 264, 286U87.
30.
See id. o* JFIe RqYpo1j .,0+TW)*0,+ o,T o+MTV *0 W033O* 3oL.,oW*OWT 01 o
daily basis by handling far more cases than anj LomjT, Wo1 W03.T*T1*Lj 3o1oQTe< Id.
31.
See id. at 263U64, 287.
32.
See Posner, supra note 5, at 1505.
33.
See id. R;PT Q0(T,13T1* Po+ T10,30)+ .,0+TW)*0,OoL ,e+0),WT+e< Id.
(citing U.S. DEP8T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 170092, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 1996, at 1
(1998); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1999, at 240 (1998)).
34.
See Posner, supra note 5, at 1505 n.59.
35.
See PHYLLIS E. MANN, NAT8L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS8N, UNDERSTANDING
THE COMPARISON OF BUDGETS FOR PROSECUTORS AND BUDGETS FOR PUBLIC DEFENSE (2011);
Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 27, at 264, 287; Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher,
Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 VA. L. REV. 79, 96 n.60, 120 (2008).
36.
MANN, supra note 35; Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 27, at 262U63.
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The legal system has evolved, in a way, around the lower incentives
and resources of the criminal prosecutor.37 The solution—both counterintuitive and constitutionally delicate—is to lower the costs of prosecution
by applying permissive thresholds that counterbalance many of the
constitutional protections that appear to hamstring the prosecutor.38
Concurrently, the legal system has moved to restrict civil cases by imposing
higher thresholds for the civil plaintiff in various areas.39 This Article details
how these changes have been accomplished and how they tend to encourage
criminal litigation in an already overburdened penal system, while
discouraging its sometime viable, and perhaps superior, substitute—the civil
case.40
The sequel is composed of four parts.41 Part II explains the
advantages of a criminal defendant over a civil one.42 These include the
criminal deST1Vo1*8+ oWWT++ *0 So(0,onLT T(OVT1WT .,0W),TV nj *PT
prosecutor; the deST1Vo1*8+ ,OQP* *0 mO*PP0ld inculpating evidence; the
requirement that the prosecutor achieve a unanimous jury verdict; the
publicity of the trial; the higher burden of proof in the criminal case; and the
double jeopardy rule that protects a successful defendant from re-litigation.43
Part III contrasts this with the peculiar advantages of civil defendants over
criminal ones.44 These include the higher threshold for a civil complaint
versus a criminal grand jury indictment; the judicial supervision of civil
discovery versus the broad leeway for criminal police investigations; and the

37.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 460, 474U76; Gershowitz &
Killinger, supra note 27, at 262U63.
38.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 474U76; The Right to a Public
Defender, JUSTIA, http://www.justia.com/criminal/procedure/miranda-rights/right-to-publicdefender/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2018).
39.
See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314
(2007); Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L. REV.
2117, 2118U19 (2015).
40.
See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 27, at 264U65; Alec Walen, Proof
Beyond a Reasonable Doubt: A Balanced Retributive Account, 76 LA. L. REV. 355, 374U76
(2015).
41.
See infra Part IIUV.
42.
See infra Part II.
43.
U.S. CONST. amend. V; Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432U33 (1995);
Mueller, supra note 20, at 13U14; Evidentiary Standards and Burdens of Proof, JUSTIA:
TRIALS & LITIGATION, http://www.justia.com/trials-litigation/evidentiary-standards-burdensproof/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2018); Janet Portman, Jury Verdicts in Criminal Trials:
Unanimous, or Not?, LAWYERS.COM: CRIM. L., http://www.lawyers.com/legalinfo/criminal/criminal-law-basics/jury-voting-requirements-to-return-a-verdict.html
(last
visited Apr. 18, 2018).
44.
See infra Part III.
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on+T1WT 0S o WO(OL VTST1Vo1*8+ ,OQP* *0 LTQoL ,T.,T+T1*o*O01e45 Part IV
considers various reasons that may explain the contrast between these two
regimes.46 Part V considers some implications of this divide.47
II.
A.

THE ADVANTAGES OF CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS OVER CIVIL ONES
Private Information and Asymmetric Disclosure

Both sides in a legal case have private information that is only
partially revealed through the trial process.48 While revelation is roughly
symmetric in the civil case, it is asymmetric in the criminal one because the
Constitution gives the criminal defendant a right to withhold unfavorable
information, while imposing a duty on the prosecutor to reveal exculpatory
evidence to the defendant.49 As explained below, this asymmetric disclosure
advantages the criminal defendant over the civil one.50
Different actors in the legal process have different private
information.51 In some cases, this private information is protected by law.52
Divergent information leads to divergent beliefs, which are not easily
corrected; essentially, the public information—information that is available
to all direct participants—Po+ *0 0(T,mPTL3 ToWP oW*0,8+ .,O(o*T O1S0,3o*O01
in order for their beliefs to converge.53 The greater the disjunction in
protected private information—and therefore in beliefs—the greater the
amount of shared inS0,3o*O01 O+ ,T-)O,TV *0 3oMT *PT oW*0,+8 nTLOTS+
coincide.54

45.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issue & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007); United States v. Williams, 504 U.S.
36, 48 (1992); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13U14 (1948).
46.
See infra Part IV.
47.
See infra Part V.
48.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
49.
See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432 (1995); Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 86 (1963).
50.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 282U83.
51.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 383, 393.
52.
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; FED. RULE CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
53.
See Robert S. Summers, Formal Legal Truth and Substantive Truth in
Judicial Fact-Finding B Their Justified Divergence in Some Particular Cases, 18 LAW &
PHIL. 497, 499 (1999).
54.
See D.S. SIVIA & J. SKILLING, DATA ANALYSIS: A BAYESIAN TUTORIAL 19
hJV TVe JccFge a,03 o "ojT+Oo1 .T,+.TW*O(TB R#+ *PT T3.O,OWoL T(OVT1WT Q,0m+f mT o,T
eventually led to the same conclusions irrespective of our initial beliefs; the posterior
[probability distribution function] is then dominated by the likelihood function, and the choice
0S *PT .,O0, nTW03T+ Lo,QTLj O,,TLT(o1*e< Id.
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Privacy protection promotes the important social goal of limiting the
intrusion 0S *PT Q0(T,13T1* 0, 0*PT, .,O(o*T .o,*OT+ O1*0 o .T,+018+ LOST o1V
work.55 ;PT a0),*P #3T1V3T1* Q)o,o1*TT+ Rq*pPT ,OQP* 0S *PT .T0.LT *0 nT
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
+To,WPT+ o1V +TOi),T+e<56 The Supreme Court has explained that this right
applies to both criminal and civil investigations.57 The language of the
#3T1V3T1* V0T+ 10* LO3O* *PT ,OQP* *0 W,O3O1oL W01*Tk*+f o1V R*PT
individuoL8+ O1*T,T+* O1 .,O(oWj o1V .T,+01oL +TW),O*j :+)SST,+ mPT*PT, *PT
governmT1*8+ 30*O(o*O01 O+ *0 O1(T+*OQo*T (O0Lo*O01+ 0S W,O3O1oL Lom+ 0,
n,ToWPT+ 0S 0*PT, e e e +*o1Vo,V+e8<58
In cases in which the sharing of private information may reduce the
divergence in beliefs, the social cost of sharing private facts may outweigh
the benefits of symmetric information.59 a0, Tko3.LTf o .T,+018+ nTLOTS+
may be influenced by privileged communications with clergy, lawyers, or
psychologists.60 Where privacy concerns do not dominate, information
asymmetries between litigants are slowly reduced as the legal process
continues.61 a0, Tko3.LTf O1 W,O3O1oL *,OoL+f *PT oWW)+TV Po+ o ,OQP* *0 RnT
O1S0,3TV 0S *PT 1o*),T o1V Wo)+T 0S *PT oWW)+o*O01e<62 Similarly, in civil
trials, the defendo1* O+ T1*O*LTV *0 Ro +P0,* o1V .LoO1 +*o*T3T1* 0S *PT WLoO3<
against her.63 Thereafter, investigations and discovery processes can further
force the parties to share unprotected private information.64
However, in criminal cases, there is an imbalance where the
prosecution is required to share evidence that helps the defT1Vo1*8+ Wo+Tf
while the defendant has a right to conceal evidence that would aid the
prosecution.65 ;PT !0),* Po+ PTLV *Po* t)T @,0WT++ O1WL)VT+ Rq*pPT
.,0+TW)*O018+ oSSO,3ative duty to disclose evidence favorable to a
VTST1Vo1*e<66 This is the so-called Brady disclosure.67 In contrast, the
55.
Search and Seizure and the Fourth Amendment, FINDLAW: LEARN ABOUT
L.,
http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-rights/search-and-seizure-and-the-fourthamendment.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2018).
56.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
57.
XTm ]T,+Tj (e ;eZeAef HFC 9e=e IJGf IIG hKCDGge Rq6pT Po(T PTLV *PT
Fourth Amendment applicable to the activities of civil as well as criminal o)*P0,O*OT+ e e e e< Id.
58.
Id. h-)0*O1Q Yo,+PoLL (e "o,L0m8+f ^1Wef HIF 9e=e IcEf IKJU13 (1978)); see
also U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
59.
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 393; Summers, supra note 53, at 499U
500.
60.
See Mueller, supra note 20, at 15.
61.
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 396.
62.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
63.
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
64.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26; see also COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 393, 396.
65.
U.S. CONST. amend. V; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
66.
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432 (1995).
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Constitution provides that a crimi1oL VTST1Vo1* Wo110* RnT W03.TLLTV O1 o1j
W,O3O1oL Wo+T *0 nT o mO*1T++ oQoO1+* PO3+TLSe<68 While the language speaks
to criminal cases, this protection is also available in at least some civil
proceedings.69 The Court has achieved this result by distinguishing the right
against self-incrimination in criminal cases from a privilege against selfincrimination in some civil contexts.70 While the right must be provided in
criminal cases, thT .,O(OLTQT RWo1 nT o++T,*TV O1 o1j .,0WTTVO1Qf WO(OL 0,
criminal, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory . . . [so long
as] the witness reasonably believes [that his statements] could be used in a
criminal prosecution or could lead to o*PT, T(OVT1WT *Po* 3OQP* nT +0 )+TVe<71
Thus, asymmetric disclosure is the norm in criminal cases, but the
relative exception in civil ones.72 Two points bear mention here: First, the
asymmetric disclosure in criminal cases refers primarily to disclosure of facts
and not law.73 The concealment of legal information, such as through the
attorney work product doctrine, is roughly symmetric in criminal and civil
cases.74 Second, coupling asymmetric factual disclosure in the criminal case
with the absence of a right to legal representation in the civil case—
discussed below—we may make a conjecture that civil litigants are relatively
likelier to diverge in their legal beliefs because they may lack experienced
legal counsel, whereas criminal litigants are likelier to diverge in their factual
beliefs.75

67.
Id. at 432U33; Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
68.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
69.
See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 (1967).
70.
!Po(Ti (e Yo,*O1Tif GID 9e=e EFcf EEc hJccIge R#L*P0)QP 0), Wo+T+ Po(T
.T,3O**TV *PT aOS*P #3T1V3T1*8+ +TLS-incrimination privilege to be asserted in non-criminal
cases . . . that does not alter our conclusion that a violation of the constitutional right against
self-incrimination occurs only if one has been compelled to be a witness against himself in a
W,O3O1oL Wo+Te< Id. (citations omitted); see also U.S. CONST. amend. V.
71.
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444U45 (1972) (footnotes
omitted).
72.
See id.; FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 282U83.
73.
See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975); Kastigar, 406 U.S.
at 444U45.
74.
See Nobles, 422 U.S. at 238, 238 n.12.
Although the work-product doctrine most frequently is asserted as a bar
to discovery in civil litigation, its role in assuring the proper functioning of the
criminal justice system is even more vital. The interests of society and the accused
in obtaining a fair and accurate resolution of the question of guilt or innocence
demand that adequate safeguards assure the thorough preparation and presentation
of each side of the case.

Id. at 238.
75.
note 53, at 499.
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;PT W,O3O1oL VTST1Vo1*8+ oWWT++ *0 TkW)L.o*0,j T(OVT1WT .,0W),TV nj
the prosecutor is a valuable advantage.76 However, it is an advantage that is
increasingly under attack.77 ;PT ,TWT1* *,T1V O+ *0 LO3O* *PT VTST1Vo1*8s
access to exculpatory evidence that she could have procured herself, had she
exercised reasonable diligence.78 For example, in a 2015 case, the Third
!O,W)O* ,)LTV *Po* RBrady does not oblige the [G]overnment to provide
defendants with evidence that [it] could obtain from other sources by
exercisO1Q ,To+01onLT VOLOQT1WTe<79 The case was appealed to the Supreme
!0),*f o1V O1 o1 o3OW)+ n,OTSf S0,3T, .,0+TW)*0,+ o,Q)TV *Po* Ro ,)LT *Po*
excuses a prosecutor from fulfilling her obligation if the defendant could
have but did not find the favorable evidence himself. . . . is tantamount to
+ojO1Q *Po* o :.,0+TW)*0, 3oj POVTf VTST1Vo1* 3)+* +TTMe8<80 The former
.,0+TW)*0,+ ),QTV *Po* +O3OLo, RVTWO+O01+ 0S +T(T,oL STVT,oL WO,W)O*+f O1WL)VO1Q
the Third Circuit, have undermined Brady by shifting focus away from the
prosecu*0,8+ oSSO,3o*O(T 0nLOQo*O01 *0 VO+WL0+Te<81 The Supreme Court
declined to review the case.82
B.

The Impartial Decision Maker and Public Scrutiny

While the fact finder in both civil and criminal matters is impartial,
the criminal prosecutor faces a steeper test in establishing facts.83 This is
because the fact finder in a criminal case is a jury, which must typically
reach a unanimous judgment.84 This unanimity requirement means that even
where a supermajority of jurors is convinced by the prosecutor, the
prosecutor is still unable to secure a favorable verdict.85 The civil plaintiff
typically only has to convince one person—the judge—whereas the criminal
prosecutor has to convince every single juror.86

76.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963).
77.
See United States v. Georgiou, 777 F.3d 125, 130, 138U39 (3d Cir. 2015).
78.
United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 973 (3d Cir. 1991).
79.
Georgiou, 777 F.3d at 140 (quoting Perdomo, 929 F.2d at 973).
80.
Amici Curiae Brief of Former Federal Prosecutors et al. in Support of the
Petitioner at 7, Georgiou v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 401 (2015) (No. 14-1535).
81.
Id. at 3.
82.
See Georgiou v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 401, 401 (2015) (mem).
83.
See Posner, supra note 5, at 1496, 1505; Portman, supra note 43.
84.
See Portman, supra note 43; Types of Juries, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/jury-service/types-juries (last visited Apr. 18, 2018).
RaO1oL 0)*W03T O+ o (T,VOW*f O1 So(0, 0S .LoO1*OSS 0, VTST1Vo1* O1 o WO(OL Wo+Tf 0, Q)OL*jf 10*
Q)OL*j O1 o W,O3O1oL Wo+Te< Types of Juries, supra.
85.
See Portman, supra note 43.
86.
Bench
Trials,
USLEGAL,
http://www.civilprocedure.uslegal.com/trial/bench-trials/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2018);
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The impartial decision-maker is meant to ensure fairness, that is, a
lack of bias.87 Decisions in criminal and civil processes involve either legal
or factual matters.88 Aside from the plaintiff and defendant, the legal process
depends on the decisions of the judge and—where applicable—the jury.89
The judge determines legal matters and, in many civil matters, decides
factual matters as well.90 The fact finder in a criminal case is typically a jury
of lay persons, whereas the fact finder in a civil case is typically a judge—
though some civil cases use juries too.91
As the Supreme Court has recently explained, a judge has a
constitutional duty to recuse himself in cases where he may have a bias; the
*T+* O+ RmPT*PT,f o+ o1 0nNTW*O(T 3o**T,f :*PT o(T,oQT N)VQT On his position is
likely to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional potential for
biase8<92 This duty is meant to ensure that the judge does not favor one
litigant over another.93 Meanwhile, the practice of de novo review of legal
questions seeks to ensure that the judge does not give undue weight to a
lower decision maker on questions of law.94 These two protections against a
biased judge are available in both civil and criminal contexts.95
Aside from the judge, the main decision-maker in the legal process is
the jury.96 In the criminal case, the constitutional right to a jury is explained
o+ S0LL0m+B R;,OoL 0S oLL !,O3T+f TkWT.* O1 !o+T+ 0S ^3.ToWP3T1*f +PoLL nT
nj ]),j&<97 Rq1p0 .T,+01 +PoLL nT PTLV *0 o1+mT, S0, o Wo.O*oLf 0, 0*PT,mO+T
infamou+ W,O3Tf )1LT++ 01 o .,T+T1*3T1* 0, O1VOW*3T1* 0S o `,o1V ]),j&<98
o1V RqOp1 oLL W,O3O1oL .,0+TW)*O01+f *PT oWW)+TV +PoLL T1N0j *PT ,OQP* *0 e e e o1
O3.o,*OoL N),j e e e e<99 Meanwhile, in the civil context, the Seventh
Portman, supra note 43; Role of the Jury, CITIZENS INFO. BOARD,
http://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/justice/courtroom/jury.html (last updated Feb. 5, 2014).
87.
Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899, 1903, 1905 (2016); Bench
Trials, supra note 86; Role of the Jury, supra note 86.
88.
Role of the Jury, supra note 86.
89.
Id.
90.
Id.
91.
Id.; Types of Juries, supra note 84.
92.
Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1905 (quoting Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.,
556 U.S. 868, 881 (2009)).
93.
See id.
94.
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842 (1984); United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556, 561 (6th Cir. 2005); Bench Trials, supra
note 86.
95.
See Williams, 136 S. Ct. at 1905; Chevron U.S.A Inc., 467 U.S. at 842;
McCain, 444 F.3d at 561.
96.
Role of the Jury, supra note 86; see also Bench Trials, supra note 86.
97.
U.S. CONST. art. III §2, cl. 3.
98.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
99.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Amend3T1* .,0(OVT+ *Po* RqOp1 q+p)O*s at common law . . . the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the
W03301 Lome<100 Thus, the right to a jury in civil cases is more limited,
applying only to cases in federal courts—RqWp0),*q+p 0S *PT 91O*TV =*o*T+<—
or to violations of federal statutes.101 As in the case of asymmetric
disclosure—*PT VTST1Vo1*8+ ,OQP* oQoO1+* +TLS-incrimination—the right to a
jury is the norm in criminal cases, but the rare exception in civil ones.102
There are two kinds of juries in most criminal trials: The trial is
conducted in front of a petit jury, whereas the indictment is sought from a
grand jury.103 The baseline belief of juries in both civil and criminal matters
is impartiality.104 #1 O3.o,*OoL N),j RPo+ 10 0.O1O01 on0)* *PT Wo+T o* *PT
+*o,* 0S *PT *,OoL o1V e e e no+T+ O*+ (T,VOW* 01 W03.T*T1* LTQoL T(OVT1WTe<105
Both civil and criminal trials impose a requirement that jurors be impartial.106
In the case of criminal trials, this requirement arises from the Sixth
Amendment,107 whereas in civil trials, it derives from the Supreme Court
precedent108 and procedural rules.109 For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1866(c) notes
*Po* o .,0+.TW*O(T N),0, 3oj nT RTkWL)VTd by the court on the ground that
+)WP .T,+01 3oj nT )1onLT *0 ,T1VT, O3.o,*OoL N),j +T,(OWTe<110 Jury
selection, which allows lawyers and judges to remove prospective jurors

100.
U.S. CONST. o3T1Ve 7^^e R;PT ,OQP* 0S *,OoL by jury as declared by the
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution—or as provided by a federal statute—is preserved to
*PT .o,*OT+ O1(O0Lo*Te< FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a).
101.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a).
102.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII; FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a); The Differences Between a
Criminal and a Civil Case, FINDLAW: LEARN ABOUT L., http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminallaw-basics/the-differences-between-a-criminal-case-and-a-civil-case.html (last visited Apr. 18,
2018).
103.
See Difference Between Grand Jury and Trial Jury, DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN:
DESCRIPTIVE
ANALYSIS
&
COMPARISONS,
http://www.differencebetween.info/difference-between-grand-jury-and-trial-jury (last visited
Apr. 18, 2018).
104.
See Role of the Jury, supra note 86.
105.
Impartial Jury, BLACK8S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
106.
Role of the Jury, supra note 86.
107.
U.S. CONST. o3T1Ve 7^e R^1 oLL W,O3O1oL .,0+TW)*O01+f *PT oWW)+TV +PoLL
enN0j *PT ,OQP* *0 o +.TTVj o1V .)nLOW *,OoLf nj o1 O3.o,*OoL N),j e e e e< Id.
108.
McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984).
^1 *PO+ WO(OL Wo+Tf *PT !0),* oSSO,3TV *Po* o R*0)WP+*01T 0S o SoO, *,OoL O+ o1 O3.o,*OoL *,OT, 0S
fact—:o N),j Wo.onLT o1V mOLLO1Q *0 VTWOVT *PT Wo+T +0LTLj 01 *PT T(OVT1WT nTS0,T O*e8< Id.
(quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982)).
109.
28 U.S.C. § 1866(c) (2012).
110.
Id.
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either with or without cause, is meant to assist in procuring an impartial petit
jury.111
Since juries are required in most criminal cases—but not in most
civil ones—and since juries must generally proffer unanimous verdicts, the
effect of requiring criminal juries is to make the establishment of facts more
difficult for the criminal prosecutor.112 A jury that fails to establish facts
either way is called a hung jury,113 which favors the defendant insofar as it
maintains the status quo and requires the prosecutor or plaintiff to spend
more if she wishes to re-litigate.114
Criminal defendants are also entitled to a public trial.115 As
mentioned earlier, the right to a public trial can counter the possibility of
collusion between different government organs—the police, prosecutor, and
judge—that is peculiar to the criminal context.116 However, publicity is not
necessarily an advantage.117 On the one hand, since the State is not only
judging but also prosecuting and investigating a criminal case, the potential
for improper collusion among these roles is greater than in civil cases, and
the publicity of a trial—like the involvement of a lay jury—can alleviate this

111.
FED. R. CIV. P. 47(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24; How Courts Work: Steps in a
Trial,
A.B.A.,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_netwo
rk/how_courts_work/juryselect.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2018). In civil cases:
The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to examine prospective jurors or
may itself do so. If the court examines the jurors, it must permit the parties or their
attorneys to make any further inquiry it considers proper, or must itself ask any of
their additional questions it considers proper.

FED. R. CIV. P. 47(a). In criminal cases, the process is substantially similar. FED. R. CRIM. P.
24. Removals without cause are called peremptory challenges, and are more available in
criminal trials than in civil ones. FED. R. CIV. P. 47(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24; How Courts
Work: Steps in a Trial, supra.
112.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; FED. R. CRIM. P. 31; Role of the Jury, supra
note 86.
113.
What Happens If There Is a Hung Jury?, FULLY INFORMED JURY ASS8N,
http://www.fija.org/document-library/jury-nullification-faq/what-happens-if-there-is-a-hungjury/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2018).
114.
See id. a0, Tko3.LTf "OLL !0+nj8+ *,OoL Tnded in a hung jury, which cost
the government $219,000. Associated Press, The Cosby Trial That Ended in a Hung Jury
Cost $219,000, BUS. INSIDER (July 13, 2017, 4:24 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/apcosby-trial-cost-219k-more-than-half-paying-for-overtime-2017-7.
115.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
116.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 291; Mueller, supra note 20, at 5, 9;
Sherilyn Streicker, Criminal Trial Publicity, NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legalencyclopedia/criminal-trial-publicity.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2018).
117.
See Mueller, supra note 20, at 3, 12U13.
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concern.118 On the other hand, publicity affords external parties the chance
to influence trials, for example, by volunteering as witnesses.119 Thus, it is a
right not only of the criminal defendant but also of the public, which may
wish to contribute to the investigation.120 A particular plaintiff may know
+03T*PO1Q on0)* o1 T3.L0jT,8+ VO+W,O3O1o*0,j .,oW*OWT+f n)* 3oj nT
unamo,T 0S 0*PT, .T,+01+ mP0 Po(T So, Q,To*T, M10mLTVQT 0S *PT VTST1Vo1*8+
bad behavior.121 Similarly, a defendant may be unaware of a witness who
saw him at another location at the time of the tried crime.122 A public trial
increases the probability that these strangers will contribute to the case.123
This apparent disadvantage for the criminal defendant can partly be
explained by the theoretically lower probability of detecting crimes versus
civil wrongs.124 Since crimes are intentional, criminals are better at being
able to conceal evidence of wrongdoing than accidental tortfeasors are, and
publicity can counteract the effects of criminal concealment.125 The
disadvantage may also be overstated, insofar as publicity only applies at the
trial stage; a stage that will never materialize if key evidence is not already
known pre-trial.126 Litigants are unlikely to proceed to trial on the bet that
some key piece of evidence will emerge from parts unknown.127 A more
troubling aspect of publicity, though, is that it can also increase the
118.
+ee D4’s; -rosec1tors; F1$"es 2ontin1e to Mee$ the -oPice 3r1taPitJ
Beast, TULLY & WEISS (Sept. 12, 2016), http://www.tully-weiss.com/blog.php?article=policebrutality-fed-by-prosecutors-das-judges_51; Streicker, supra note 116.
119.
See Streicker, supra note 116.
120.
See Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209, 212 (2010) (per curiam); Streicker,
supra 10*T KKFe R;PT =Ok*P #3T1dment right [to a public trial] . . . is the right of the accused.
The Court has further held that the public trial right extends beyond the accused and can be
O1(0MTV )1VT, *PT aO,+* #3T1V3T1*e< Presley, 558 U.S. at 212 (citing Press-Enterprise. Co.
v. Superior Court of Cal. for Riverside, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984)).
121.
See Anthony N. Luti, *he -Paintiff’s O87PoJ8ent 2aseQ Kettin" the
Discovery
You
Need,
LUTI
L.
FIRM,
http://www.lutilaw.com/articles/ARTICLE%20REPRINT%20%20Getting%20Employment%20Discovery.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2018).
122.
See Tim Prudente, After 13 Years, Baltimore Man Free After New
Witnesses Say He Is Innocent of 2004 Murder, BALT. SUN (Sept. 19, 2017, 4:40 PM),
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/crime/bs-md-ci-johnson-exonerated-20170919story.html; Brett Snider, If You Witness a Crime, Do You Have to Testify?, FINDLAW (Oct. 14,
2014, 12:37 PM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/blotter/2014/10/if-you-witness-a-crime-do-youhave-to-testify.html.
123.
See Streicker, supra note 116.
124.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 286.
125.
See id.
126.
See Mueller, supra note 20, at 5U6; James, How Prosecutors Initiate
Cases for Criminal Charges, LUKE POWELL: LEGAL ADVISE BLOG (Feb. 5, 2015),
http://www.lukepowell.com/2015/02/how-prosecutors-initiate-cases-for-criminal-charges/.
127.
See Mueller, supra note 20, at 17; James, supra note 126.
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likelihood of biased juries, where unfavorable media coverage poisons the
minds of the public against the prosecution or defense.128 However, jury bias
and the production of new evidence will obviously make a jury lean prodefendant or anti-defendant, and may, in the absence of skewed selection,
cancel out on average.129
Civil litigants can also appeal using First Amendment arguments
supporting the access of the public court proceedings.130 In spite of this
possibility, most jurisdictions do not require public civil trials.131 This
implies that civil cases are more likely to exclude information from parties
that are unknown to the direct participants: Anyone who hears of a criminal
case can come forward to volunteer information, but if no one hears of the
civil case, then no one will come forward either.132
C.

Civil Versus Criminal Judgments

At the judgment stage, most would agree that the criminal prosecutor
faces a clearly higher threshold than civil plaintiffs do.133 However, even
this seemingly obvious contrast appears more illusory than real.134 In the
sequel, we consider the two civil thresholds—preponderance of the evidence
and clear and convincing evidence, followed by the criminal threshold of
beyond a reasonable doubt.135
First, the preponderance of the evidence standard is used to establish
o VTST1Vo1*8+ LOonOLO*j O1 most civil cases.136 It embodies a presumption that
the defendant is just as likely to be liable as not, in civil cases.137 Some
128.
See Mueller, supra note 20, at 11U13.
129.
See id.
130.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I; NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v. Superior
Court of L.A. Cty., 980 P.2d 337, 368 (Cal. 1999).
131.
See NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc., 980 P.2d at 364U65; 3rd Cir. B
Open Courts Compendium: Access to Civil Proceedings, REP. COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/3rd-cir-open-courts-compendium/general-1 (last visited Apr.
18, 2018).
132.
See NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc., 980 P.2d at 364U65; Mueller, supra
note 20, at 12U13; Streicker, supra note 116.
133.
See Geoffrey G. Nathan, Preponderance of Evidence vs Reasonable
Doubt, FEDERALCHARGES.COM, http://www.federalcharges.com/preponderance-evidence-vsreasonable-doubt/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2018).
134.
See Evidentiary Standards and Burdens of Proof, supra note 43.
135.
C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of
Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1294 (1982); Nathan, supra
note 133.
136.
Evidentiary Standards and Burdens of Proof, supra note 43.
137.
See Herman v. Huddlestonf HGC 9e=e IEGf ICc hKCDIge Rq@p,T.01VT,o1WTof-the-T(OVT1WT +*o1Vo,V oLL0m+ n0*P .o,*OT+ *0 :+Po,T *PT ,O+M 0S T,,0, O1 ,0)QPLj T-)oL
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writers have expressed it as an objective probabilistic threshold, either in
terms of absolute probability138—for example, probability of liability greater
than 0.5—or in terms of relative odds—for example, odds in favor greater
than one to one.139 Others have suggested a subjective interpretation, based
on the cumulative effect of the evidence on the fact finder.140
Second, proving liability by clear and convincing evidence requires
either at least the same probability of liability as in the preponderance—but
with more precision—or a higher probability of liability than preponderance
with at least the same precision.141 By precision, we mean the reciprocal of
the variance, or the lack of variance, in an estimate.142 For example, suppose
that Jury A thinks the defendant is liable with a probability uniformly
distributed between 0.3 and 0.8, whereas Jury B thinks that she is liable with
probability uniformly distributed between 0.5 and 0.6.143 Both juries expect
that the deST1Vo1* O+ LOonLT mO*P .,0nonOLO*j ceGGf *PT o(T,oQTf n)* ]),j "8+
expectation is more precise because its estimate varies over a smaller
range.144 ^1 *PO+ Wo+Tf ]),j "8+ (T,dict may meet the clear and convincing
*P,T+P0LV mPOLT ]),j #8+ (T,VOW* 3oj 10*f T(T1 *P0)QP n0*P Tk.TW* *PT +o3T
probability of liability.145 Alternatively, the clear and convincing standard
may be interpreted to mean a higher probability than 0.5, or one-to-one odds,
as in the case of preponderance, or even a combination of the two.146 Cases

So+PO01e8 #1j 0*PT, +*o1Vo,V Tk.,T++T+ o .,TST,T1WT S0, 01T +OVT8+ O1*T,T+*+e< Id. (citation
omitted) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1978)).
138.
Edward K. Cheng, Reconceptualizing the Burden of Proof, 122 YALE L.J.
1254, 1274 (2013).
A requirement that more than 50% of the evidence points to something. This is the
burden of proof in a civil trial. For example, [a]t the end of civil case A v. B, 51%
of the evidence favors A; [t]hus, A has a preponderance of the evidence, A has met
their burden of proof, and A will win the case.
Civil
Suit:
Travis
Family
Goes
After
Arias
$$$,
CNN:
HLN,
http://www.hlntv.com/article/2013/05/09/civil-suit-travis-family-goes-after-arias/ (May 9,
2013, 5:43 PM).

139.
See Cheng, supra note 138, at 1259, 1268.
140.
See id. at 1266U68.
141.
See Evidentiary Standards and Burdens of Proof, supra note 43.
RPreponderance of the evidence :3To1+ mPo* O* +oj+f (Oief *Po* *PT T(OVT1WT 01 01T +OVT
outweighs, preponderates over, is more than, the evidence on the other side, not necessarily in
number of witnesses or quantity, but in its effect on those to whom it is adV,T++TVe8< `LoQT (e
Hawes Firearms Co., 276 Cal. Rptr. 430, 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (quoting People v. Miller,
171 Cal. 649, 652 (Cal. 1916)).
142.
See Cheng, supra note 138, at 1259U60, 1268.
143.
See id.
144.
See id. at 1268.
145.
See id.; Evidentiary Standards and Burdens of Proof, supra note 43.
146.
See Cheng, supra note 138, at 1259, 1267U68; Evidentiary Standards and
Burdens of Proof, supra note 43.
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do not seem to recommend one interpretation over the others.147
Nevertheless, this standard is used to overcome a strong presumption—
typically when either an important but non-constitutional individual
interest148 or a clear public policy is challenged.149 Some cases suggest that it
is employed to establish, or avoid, civil liability that is penal in nature.150
For example, courts have used this standard to determine whether o .o,T1*8+
rights should be terminated because of an irremediable pattern of domestic
abuse.151 This is an intermediate standard between the default civil and
criminal standards considered immediately above and below.152 Formally,
we can say only that this standard is higher than preponderance, but not
much beyond that.153 In applying the clear and convincing evidence standard
to actions challenging the validity of a patent, the Supreme Court merely
147.
See Cheng, supra note 138, at 1258.
148.
See Weiner v. Fleischman, 816 P.2d 892, 898 (Cal. 1991)e R@,00S nj WLTo,
o1V W01(O1WO1Q T(OVT1WT O+ ,T-)O,TV :mPT,T .o,*OW)Lo,Lj O3.0,*o1* O1VO(OV)oL O1*T,T+*+ 0,
,OQP*+ o,T o* +*oMTf8 +)WP o+ *PT *T,3O1o*O01 0S .o,T1*oL ,OQP*+f O1(0L)1*o,j W033O*3T1*f o1V
VT.0,*o*O01e< Id. (quoting Herman v. Huddleston, 459 9e=e IEGf IDC hKCDIgge R_0mT(T,f
:O3.0+O*O01 0S T(T1 +T(T,T WO(OL +o1W*O01+ *Po* V0 10* O3.LOWo*T +)WP O1*T,T+*+ Po+ nTT1
.T,3O**TV oS*T, .,00S nj o .,T.01VT,o1WT 0S *PT T(OVT1WTe8< Id. (quoting Herman, 459 U.S. at
389U90).
149.
See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Limited Partnership, 564 U.S. 91, 95, 112U13
(2011) (requiring an alleged patent infringer to prove an affirmative defense that the
controlling patent was invalid by clear and convincing evidence).
150.
See 15 U.S.C. ' JcDEhnghJgh"ghO(g hJcKJge R>TLOTS 3oj not be ordered
[against an employer taking a personnel action against a whistleblowing employee] if the
employer demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the employer would have taken
the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of [whis*LTnL0mO1Qp nTPo(O0,e< Id.;
Ferris v. Turlington, 510 So. 2d 292, 294 (Fla. 1987) (requiring clear and convincing evidence
*0 ,T(0MT o *ToWPT,8+ LOWT1+Tge
151.
See In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640, 642 (Ind. 2014).
152.
See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432U33 (1979). In discussing civil
commitment proceedings, the Court reasoned:
We have concluded that the reasonable-doubt standard is inappropriate
in civil commitment proceedings because, given the uncertainties of psychiatric
diagnosis, it may impose a burden the state cannot meet and thereby erect an
unreasonable barrier to needed medical treatment. Similarly, we conclude that use
of the term unequivocal is not constitutionally required, although the states are free
to use that standard. To meet due process demands, the standard has to inform the
factfinder that the proof must be greater than the preponderance-of-the-evidence
standard applicable to other categories of civil cases.
We noted earlier that the trial court employed the standard of clear,
unequivocal and convincing T(OVT1WT O1 o..TLLo1*8+ W033O*3T1* PTo,O1Q nTS0,T o
jury. That instruction was constitutionally adequate. However, determination of
the precise burden equal to or greater than the clear and convincing standard which
we hold is required to meet due process guarantees is a matter of state law . . . .

Id.; Evidentiary Standards and Burdens of Proof, supra note 43.
153.
See Weiner, 816 P.2d at 896; Evidentiary Standards and Burden of Proof,
supra note 43.
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10*TV *Po* *PO+ +*o1Vo,V mo+ o..,0.,Oo*T nTWo)+T Ro .,T.01VTrance standard
of proof was too dubious a basis to deem a [presumptively valid] patent
O1(oLOVe<154
Finally, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is used to establish a
VTST1Vo1*8+ Q)OL* O1 o W,O3O1oL Wo+T.155 The general impression is that this
standard is much higher than the civil ones and provides the starkest
advantage to the criminal defendant over a civil one.156 Indeed, the Supreme
!0),* Po+ +oOV *Po* Ro .T,+01 oWW)+TV 0S o W,O3T e e e m0)LV nT o* o +T(T,T
disadvantage, a disadvantage amounting to a lack of fundamental fairness, if
he could be adjudged guilty and imprisoned for years on the strength of the
same evidence as would suffice in a civil casee<157 But this impression may
also be wrong.158 The beyond a reasonable doubt standard has caused much
confusion and has even been abandoned in some jurisdictions.159 Surveyed
judges have generally equated the standard with a probability of guilt higher
than 90%.160 Meanwhile, potential jurors, who actually apply the standard,
appear to almost equate it with a preponderance of the evidence.161
154.
Microsoft Corp., 564 U.S. at 102.
155.
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970).
156.
Id. at 367. In a criminal case, the evidence upon which the jury are
justified in finding a verdict of guilty must be sufficient to satO+Sj *PT3 0S *PT .,O+01T,8+ Q)OL*
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 361.
157.
Id. at 363 (quoting W. v. Family Court, 247 N.E.2d 253, 259 (N.Y. 1969),
re0’$, In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 358).
158.
See LARRY LAUDAN, TRUTH, ERROR, AND CRIMINAL LAW: AN ESSAY IN
LEGAL EPISTEMOLOGY 31 (2006).
159.
Id. at 32.
England, which has the same common law tradition as our own, has recently
abandoned its two-hundred-year-old practice of having judges instruct jurors about
the nature of reasonable doubt. Instead, jurors there are simply told that conviction
requires that they must be sure of the guilt of the accused. England made this
change because senior legal theorists concluded that reasonable doubt could be
neither defined, nor uniformly understood, nor consistently applied.

Id. Rq;pPO+ 10*O01 0S .,00S O+ Q,OT(0)+Lj O1oVT-)o*Tf VTLOnT,o*TLj unclear, wholly subjective,
and open to about as many interpretations as there are judges, to whom it falls to explain this
10*O01 *0 Po.LT++ N),0,+e< Id. at 30.
160.
Walen, supra note 40, at 374.
In one study of federal judges throughout the United States, nearly three quarters of
the 171 who responded to the poll picked a probability that was 90% or higher; and
in a second study, this one of Illinois state judges, the mean probability was 89%,
with 63% of the judges picking a level of 90% or higher.

Id. (citing Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Some
Doubt About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105, 126 (1999)).
161.
See Walen, supra note 40, at 374U76 (providing a literature review of tests
showing that potential jurors consider the beyond a reasonable doubt standard as a low
standard). For example:
In one study, Robert MacCoun and Norbert Kerr constructed a trial transcript
that was as equivocal as possible. The authors gave the transcript to mock
juries composed of four students. Half of the juries received a reasonable
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Perhaps more interesting than the exact thresholds in these cases is
the fact that all three are conditional.162 In particular, they are conditioned on
the quality of the procedures used beforehand.163 Even if the criminal
threshold was higher than the civil one at the judgment stage, conditional on
both procedures being equally protective—and we have shown that it may
not be—it may well be a lower threshold unconditionally.164 Criminal
investigators already have advantages at the pre-trial stage, so higher trial
thresholds may not reverse the prior pro-prosecutor imbalances.165
D.

Expedition and Finality

Both criminal and civil cases operate under time constraints.166
These effectively limit the amount of information that the parties can acquire
or present.167 A prosecutor may be unable to persuade witnesses to speak in
a limited time frame; however, more time might have allowed her to
convince them.168 91VT, *PT !01+*O*)*O01f RqOp1 oLL W,O3O1oL .,0+TW)*O01+f *PT
accused shall enjoy tPT ,OQP* *0 o +.TTVj e e e *,OoLe<169 This right is elucidated
in the Speedy Trial Act of 1974,170 which now requires that, absent an
enumerated exception, criminal trials must commence within seventy days of

doubt instruction, and the other half received a preponderance of the evidence
instruction. Only 36% of the latter juries found the defendant guilty, implying
that the case was weak. On that basis, one would hope that none of the juries
given a reasonable doubt instruction would find the mock defendant guilty.
Instead, 21% of those juries found the defendant guilty. This shows that a
substantial number of jurors interpreted the [beyond a reasonable doubt]
instruction to allow conviction on weak evidence, evidence that would not
even satisfy the preponderance of the evidence standard for more than half of
the juries that considered it.

Id. at 374U75 (footnotes omitted).
162.
See Cheng, supra note 138, at 1259; Solan, supra note 160, at 114, 117;
Evidentiary Standards and Burden of Proof, supra note 43.
163.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 12; FED. R. CRIM. P. 12; Evidentiary Standards and
Burden of Proof, supra note 43.
164.
See Cheng, supra note 138, at 1259; Walen, supra note 40, at 370.
165.
See Posner, supra note 5, at 1505.
166.
18 U.S.C. § 3161 (a)U(b) (2012); NAT8L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME,
supra note 10, at 9.
167.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3161; COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 269; Gershowitz
& Killinger, supra note 27, at 264U65; Jerold H. Israel, Excessive Criminal Justice Caseloads:
Challenging the Conventional Wisdom, 48 FLA. L. REV. 761, 764U66 (1996).
168.
See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 27, at 264U65; Snider, supra note
122.
169.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
170.
Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1975)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161U3174 (1975)); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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the indictment or first information.171 Civil defendants can appeal instead to
statutory rules such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which require
*Po* *PTj nT RW01+*,)TVf oV3O1O+*T,TVf o1V T3.L0jTV nj *PT W0),* o1V *PT
parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proWTTVO1Qe<172 The requirements of speed and expedition mean
that while many non-legal decisions can be deliberated upon almost
indefinitely, legal judgments have a limited window for deliberations and the
presentation of information.173
The costs of delayed decisions can
overwhelm both the litigants and the judicial system.174
The speedy trial may be more advantageous to the criminal
defendo1* *Po1 *PT WO(OL 01T nTWo)+T 0S *PT VOSST,T1WT O1 *PTO, oV(T,+o,OT+8
caseloads.175 Prosecutors tend to have many more cases to try than civil
plaintiffs in a given timeframe, and time constraints can amplify this
difference.176 If the prosecutor is asked to conclude ten cases in the time it
takes a civil plaintiff to conclude just one, then the quality of the prosecut0,8+
m0,M mOLL +)SST,f o1V *PO+ 3oj O1),T *0 *PT W,O3O1oL VTST1Vo1*8+ nT1TSO*e177
The reason for using the qualifier may instead of will is that a prosecutor
under time con+*,oO1*+ Wo1 oL+0 3oMT *PT VTST1Vo1*8+ LOST VOSSOW)L* nj SoOLO1Q
to spot weaknesses in her own case or by offering plea deals that she might
have, if she had more time to consider her options.178 Insofar as a hurried
prosecutor can err in ways that both help and hurt the defendant, it is difficult
to ascertain whether the speedy criminal trial truly leaves the defendant in a
better position.179
Another limitation is on re-trying a case that has been concluded.180
^1 o W,O3O1oL Wo+Tf *PT !01+*O*)*O01 W033o1V+ *Po* R10, +PoLL o1j .T,+01 nT
subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy 0S LOST 0, LO3ne<181
171.
18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). Before being amended in 1979, the Speedy Trial
Act of 1974 originally called for criminal trials *0 +*o,* RmO*PO1 +Ok*j Voj+ S,03 o,,oOQ13T1* 01
*PT O1S0,3o*O01 0, O1VOW*3T1*e< DD =*o*e o* JcEEe
172.
FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
173.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1); Israel, supra note 167, at 765.
174.
See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 27, at 262U64; Israel, supra note
167, at 761U62.
175.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 27, at
262U63; Israel, supra note 167, at 761U62.
176.
See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 27, at 262U65; Israel, supra note
167, at 761U62.
177.
See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 27, at 262U64; Israel, supra note
167, at 761U62.
178.
See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 27, at 263U64 (emphasis added).
179.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 27, at
263; Israel, supra note 167, at 766.
180.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
181.
Id.
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The rough analogue in civil cases are the doctrines of claim preclusion, or res
judicata,182 and issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel.183 The Supreme
!0),* Tk.LoO1+ *Po* )1VT, WLoO3 .,TWL)+O01f Ro SO1oL N)VQ3T1* 01 *PT 3T,O*+
of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that
mT,T 0, W0)LV Po(T nTT1 ,oO+TV O1 *Po* oW*O01e<184 Whereas under issue
preclu+O01f R01WT o W0),* Po+ VTWOVTV o1 O++)T 0S SoW* 0, Lom 1TWT++o,j *0 O*+
judgment, that decision may preclude relitigation of the issue in a suit on a
difST,T1* Wo)+T 0S oW*O01 O1(0L(O1Q o .o,*j *0 *PT SO,+* Wo+Te<185
Finality operates as a protection for the defendant against an
identical claim or issue being relitigated in the future.186 This protection is
arguably stronger in the criminal case than in the civil one for two reasons:
(1) The Supreme Court has apparently subsumed the civil res judicata and
collatT,oL T+*0..TL .,0*TW*O01+ 0S WO(OL Lom O1*0 *PT aOS*P #3T1V3T1*8+
Double Jeopardy clause, thereby elevating a common law protection in civil
cases into a constitutional protection in criminal cases; and (2) The Supreme
Court has suggested that the constitutional Double Jeopardy provision may
have application beyond res judicata and collateral estoppel as well.187
However, the greater protection of criminal defendants through the
finality of judgments is easily overstated.188 In particular, the Supreme Court
has allowed the prosecutor to relitigate issues that a civil plaintiff would be
estopped from revisiting.189 In Standefer v. United States,190 the Court
reasoned that a prosecutor was not estopped from relitigating an issue against
an aider and abettor in a criminal case, even though the principal that the
defendant had allegedly aided had been acquitted of the offense.191 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court drew three distinctions between a civil
plaintiff and a prosecutor to justify this result: (1) the prosecutor had
182.
(4th Cir. 1989).
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc. v. E. Auto Distribs., Inc., 892 F.2d 355, 359
Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
Id.
See Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443.
See U.S. CONST. amend. V; Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443, 445U46.

The ultimate question to be determined, then, . . . is whether this
established rule of federal law is embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee
against double jeopardy. We do not hesitate to hold that it is. For whatever else
that constitutional guarantee may embrace it surely protects a man who has been
acquitted from having to run the gantlet a second time.

Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445U46 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Green v. United
States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957)).
188.
See Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 22U24 (1980).
189.
See id. at 25U26.
190.
447 U.S. 10 (1980).
191.
Id. at 22 n.16, 25U26.
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procedural limitations that were inapplicable to civil plaintiffs, such as—
supposedly—more limited discovery, the unavailability of judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, and limited or no appeal from an adverse
N)VQ3T1*& hJg *PT .,0+TW)*0,8+ onOLO*j *0 O1*,0V)WT T(OVT1WT mo+ 30,T LO3O*TV
*Po1 o WO(OL .LoO1*OSS8+ nTWo)+T 0S *PT TkWL)+O01o,j ,)LT and similar devices;
and (3) the state had a special interest in the enforcement of criminal laws.192
The most meaningful advantage of finality for the criminal defendant
does not lie in Double Jeopardy protection—which is arguably balanced by
lower collateral estoppel and res judicata protections—but in an asymmetric
right of appeal.193 Both criminal and civil defendants can appeal against
defective adverse judgments.194 In most civil cases, other than small claims,
the plaintiff has a right to appeal an adverse judgment for good cause;
however, in criminal cases, the prosecutor has virtually no right of appeal.195
Thus, errors in favor of the civil defendant are likelier to be rectified than
errors in favor of the criminal defendant.196
III.

THE ADVANTAGES OF CIVIL DEFENDANTS OVER CRIMINAL ONES

A.
Case by Case Civil Protections Versus Enumerated Criminal
Protections
Criminal and civil cases differ as to various procedural limitations
that control whether, and how, litigants can collect information, present the
information they have, or challenge the information of the other side. 197
Limitations on the gathering and use of information create two
expectations.198 First, we expect prospective litigants—who have access to
greater information—to have stronger beliefs about the matters involved.199
=TW01Vf mT Tk.TW* *PT SoW* SO1VT,8+ nTLOTS+ *0 nT WL0+T, *0 *PT nTLOTS+ 0S *PT
192.
Id. at 22U25.
193.
See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980); Standefer, 447 U.S. at 22U
23, 22 n.16, 25.
194.
See Standefer, 447 U.S. at 22U23.
195.
See id. at 23; William S. McAninch, Unfolding the Law of Double
Jeopardy, 44 S.C. L. REV. 411, 496 (1993). In limited circumstances, the prosecutor can
appeal a sentence, though she cannot appeal a verdict. McAninch, supra, at 496. An example
0S o..ToLO1Q o +T1*T1WT m0)LV nT mPT,T *PT W0),*8+ +Tntence was above or below the
sentencing limits set by a statute. FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(j)(1)(B); see also McAninch, supra, at
496.
196.
See Standefer, 447 U.S. at 22U23.
197.
See Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural
Boundaries, 94 VA. L. REV. 79, 88U89, 92 (2008).
198.
See id. at 91U93, 134U36; Summers, supra note 53, at 499U500.
199.
See Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 197, at 91; Summers, supra note 53,
at 499U500.
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litigant, who has greater information or opportunity to present her case. 200
The litiQo1*+8 o1V SoW* SO1VT,+8 *T1VT1WOT+ o,T ,To+01onLj .,TVOW*onLT O1 *he
criminal context, but vary case by case in civil litigation.201 Under the Fifth
Amend3T1*f o .T,+01 3oj R10q*p nT VT.,O(TV 0S LOSTf LOnT,*jf 0, .,0.T,*jf
mO*P0)* V)T .,0WT++ 0S Lome<202 Due process has been bifurcated into
substantive due process, which covers certain rights that any party must have
in any due process; and procedural due process, which covers the actions
adjudicators, litigants, or connected parties must take, or refrain from, in
particular cases.203 Due process applies to both civil and criminal matters.204
However, courts have interpreted it differently in these two contexts.205 In
civil matters, the court applies the three-part test from Mathews v.
Eldridge206 to determine what due process requires in a particular case:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
GovT,13T1*8+ interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
207
procedural requirement would entail.

The Mathews test is essentially an adaptation of Judge Learned
_o1V8+ *T+* S0, 1TQLOQT1WT208 to the constitutional due process context: If B
is the burden to the government of marginally greater procedural protections,
P O+ *PT .,0nonOLO*j *Po* *PT VTST1Vo1*8+ O1*T,T+* O+ T,,01T0)+Lj O1S,O1QTVf o1V
L is the magnitude of that interest—net of any countervailing benefit to the
state—then the state should provide greater due process protection if
B<PL.209 In practice, courts have used the Due Process Clause to extend

200.
See Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 197, at 91; Summers, supra note 53,
at 499U500.
201.
See Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 197, at 92U93.
202.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
203.
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).
204.
Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. &
POL8Y REV. 1, 6U7 (2006).
205.
See id.
206.
424 U.S. 319 (1976).
207.
Id. at 335.
208.
See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir.
1947); Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
209.
See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335; Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173.
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some of the rights that the Constitution only provides for criminal trials to
civil trials.210
On the other hand, in the criminal context, the court has held that
RqnpTj01V *PT +.TWOSOW Q)o,o1*TT+ T1)3T,o*TV O1 *PT "OLL 0S >OQP*+f *PT t)T
@,0WT++ !Lo)+T Po+ LO3O*TV 0.T,o*O01e<211 While important enumerated
protections apply to only criminal cases, the Mathews test allows for these
and potentially further protections for the civil defendant on a case by case
basis.212 In particular, while civil protections may apply at any stage—trial
or pre-trial—most of the criminal protections apply only at the trial or posttrial stage.213 # +),.,O+O1Q W01+T-)T1WT 0S *PO+ VO+*O1W*O01 O+ *Po* RW,O3inal
defendants constitutionally may be arrested, detained, and suspended from
government employment before trial with less meaningful hearing rights than
comparable deprivatio1+ m0)LV ,T-)O,T O1 WO(OL LO*OQo*O01e<214 Given that
most cases—criminal or civil—never proceed to trial at all, the implication is
that in practice, criminal defendants may have fewer protections than civil
ones.215 In the pre-trial stages of a criminal versus a civil case, the fact
SO1VT,8s nTLOTS+ o,T LOMTLj *0 nT WL0+T, *0 *PT .,0+TW)*O018+ *Po1 *PT
VTST1Vo1*8+f +O1WT *PT W,O3O1oL VTST1Vo1*8+ V)T .,0WT++ ,OQP*+ o,T 30,T
limited.216
The following sketch depicts the comparison of information
gathering in the civil and criminal processes.217

210.
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970). An example is the right
to confront adverse witnesses, discussed below. Id.; see also infra Section III.D.
211.
Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992) (quoting Dowling v.
United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990)) (alteration in original).
212.
Medina, 505 U.S. at 443U44; Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
213.
Kuckes, supra note 204, at 4U5, 39.
214.
Id. at 3U4, 39.
215.
See id. at 3U5, 39; Patricia Lee Refo, Opening Statement: The Vanishing
Trial, A.B.A. SEC. LITIG., Winter 2004, at 1, 2U3.
216.
See Kuckes, supra note 204, at 3U4, 22U25, 39.
217.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 393; Kuckes, supra note 204, at 4U
5, 7; Peter Lewisch, 7700: Criminal Procedure, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA L. & ECON.: ECON. CRIME
& LITIG. 241, 253 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol42/iss2/2

24

Kayani: Law Done Backwards: The Tightening Of Civil And Loosening Of Crim

2018]

LAW DONE BACKWARDS: THE TIGHTENING OF CIVIL

203

At the early stages of the civil process, the plaintiff must meet
relatively high thresholds to continue the investigation, whereas the criminal
prosecutor faces lower limits.218 At the trial stage, the criminal prosecutor
faces higher thresholds than the civil plaintiff, notably because of the
deST1Vo1*8+ T1Po1WTV .,0*TW*O01+f T(OVT1WT (T**O1Qf o POQPT, n),VT1 0S .,00Sf
and the lopsided opportunity to appeal.219 The preceding section has shown
how many of these protections for criminal defendants have either been
whittled down or replicated in the civil case, thus making the civil-criminal
contrast weaker.220 In the sequel, we consider how civil protections at some
stages have been increased to levels not seen in the criminal context.221
218.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8; David S. Evans, What You Need to Know About
Twombly: The Use and Misuse of Economic and Statistical Evidence in Pleadings, GCP,
July
2009,
at
1,
2,
http://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/0d358061e11f2708ad9d62634c6c40ad/
EVANS-JULY-09_2_.pdf; Evidentiary Standards and Burdens of Proof, supra note 43.
RtOSST,T1WT+ +*T3 S,03 *PT 30,T ,T+*,Octive use of suspect evidence in criminal cases—as
embodied in the respective constitutional rights/amendments—which, albeit only partially,
can be explained on grounds of the increased costliness of type one errors in criminal than in
WO(OL Wo+T+e< ZTmO+WPf supra note 217, at 253.
219.
See U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI; Lewisch, supra note 217, at 253, 255;
Nathan, supra note 133.
220.
See Kuckes, supra note 204, at 34, 38; supra Part III.
221.
See infra Part IV.
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The Civil Complaint Versus the Criminal Indictment

To commence the formal legal process, the civil plaintiff files a
complaint, whereas the criminal prosecutor typically seeks an indictment. 222
The standard for the civil complaint is plausible evidence,223 and in the case
of securities fraud litigation, strong inference;224 whereas the standard for a
criminal indictment is probable cause.225 A comparison of these standards
will highlight the difference between civil and criminal thresholds.226
The Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly227 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal228 cases
established the plausible evidence standard to discourage meritless
complaints and avoid wasteful discovery costs in civil cases.229 This
standard is notably higher than the notice pleading regime that preceded it.230
The Third Circuit applies the plausible evidence standard as a three part test:
222.
FED. R. CIV. P. 3; FED. R. CRIM. P. 7.
223.
David S. Evans, What You Need to Know About Twombly: The Use and
Misuse of Economic and Statistical Evidence in Pleadings, GCP, July 2009, at 1, 3U4,
http://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/0d358061e11f2708ad9d62634c6c40ad/
EVANS-JULY-09_2_.pdf; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)
(Stevens, J., dissenting). The Twombly Court instead explained that Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint include facts—as distinct from legal labels
and conclusions—giving rise to a plausible, rather than merely conceivable, entitlement to
relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570. Two years later in Iqbal, the Court confirmed that
Twombly applies to all civil suits, not just antitrust cases or complex cases. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009).
224.
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007).
The majority held that plaintiffs must demonstrate a cogent inference of scienter at least as
strong as any opposing inference from the defendant. Id.
225.
Id. at 336. Probable cause is a requirement found in the Fourth
Amendment that must usually be met before police make an arrest, conduct a search, or
receive a warrant. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Probable cause exists when there is a fair
probability that a search will result in evidence of a crime being discovered. See Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238U39 (1983).
226.
Evans, supra note 223, at 4; Gates, 462 U.S. at 230U31; Tellabs, Inc., 551
U.S. at 314.
227.
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
228.
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
229.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.

Id.

[T]he threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even
anemic cases before reaching [summary judgment]. Probably, then, it is only by
taking care to require allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that we
can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery in cases with no
reasonably founded hope that the discovery process will reveal relevant evidence.

230.
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45UHE hKCGEge Rq#p W03.LoO1* +P0)LV
not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff
Wo1 .,0(T 10 +T* 0S SoW*+ O1 +)..0,* 0S PO+ WLoO3 mPOWP m0)LV T1*O*LT PO3 *0 ,TLOTSe< Id. at 45U
46.
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(1) check that the plaintiff has pled every element of the claim; (2) check that
*PT .LoO1*OSS8+ oLLTQo*O01+ O1 +)..0,* 0S ToWP TLT3T1* o,T 10* 3T,TLj
conclusions—for example, this element is met—but statements of fact from
which conclusions may be inferred—for example, if these facts are true then
this element is likely met; and (3) assuming that non-conclusory allegations
are true, decide whether they plausibly entitle the plaintiff to relief.231 This
test does clarify that every element of the claim must be supported by factual
allegations from which the element may be inferred.232 However, it does not
tell us how strong that inference needs to be.233 Judge Posner explained the
plausibility standard in Atkins v. City of Chicago234 o+ S0LL0m+B R*PT
complaint taken as a whole must establish a non-negligible probability that
the claim is valid, though it need not be so great a probability as such terms
as preponderance of the evidence W0110*Te<235 This probabilistic view is
perhaps at odds with Iqbal8+ Lo1Q)oQT *Po* Rq*pPT .Lo)+OnOLO*j +*o1Vo,V O+ 10*
akin to a probability requiremente<236 However, it is difficult to understand
the standard in a non-probabilistic way; moreover, a probabilistic view, even
if imperfect, helps us usefully compare thresholds such as plausible evidence
and preponderance.237
In securities fraud litigation, the higher strong inference standard is
used to sift strong complaints from weaker ones.238 The policy concern is
+O3OLo, *0 *Po* S0, *PT .Lo)+OnLT T(OVT1WT +*o1Vo,VB *Po* Rq.p,O(o*T +TW),O*OT+
fraud actions . . . if not adequately contained, can be employed abusively to
impose substantial costs on companies and individuals whose conduct

231.

Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d Cir. 2016).

Under the pleading regime established by Twombly and Iqbal, a court
,T(OTmO1Q *PT +)SSOWOT1Wj 0S o W03.LoO1* 3)+* *oMT *P,TT +*T.+e aO,+*f O* 3)+* R*oMT
10*T 0S *PT TLT3T1*+ *PT .LoO1*OSS 3)+* .LToV *0 +*o*T o WLoO3e< =TW01Vf O* +P0)LV
identify allego*O01+ *Po*f RnTWo)+T *PTj o,T 10 30,T *Po1 W01WL)+O01+f o,T 10*
T1*O*LTV *0 *PT o++)3.*O01 0S *,)*Pe< aO1oLLjf RmPT1 *PT,T o,T mTLL-pleaded factual
allegations, the court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to o1 T1*O*LT3T1* *0 ,TLOTSe<

Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675, 679) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
232.
See id.
233.
See id.
234.
631 F.3d 823 (7th Cir. 2011).
235.
Id. at 832.
236.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Atkins, 631 F.3d at 832.
237.
Atkins, 631 F.3d at 831.
238.
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Isues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313U14, 324
(2007). Securities fraud complaints are typically brought under section 10(b) of the Securities
bkWPo1QT #W* 0S KCIH o1V )1VT, 9e=e =TW),O*OT+ o1V bkWPo1QT !033O++O01 hR=b!<g ,ule
10b-5. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, sec. 376, § 10B, 124 Stat. 1376, 1778 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 78j-2 (2010));
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017).
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confor3+ *0 *PT Lome<239 The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
hR@=Z>#<g ,T-)O,T+ *Po* R*PT W03.LoO1* +PoLL e e e +*o*T mO*P .o,*OW)Lo,O*j
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
,T-)O,TV +*o*T 0S 3O1Ve<240 However, even though the concerns are similar,
the threshold for strong inference is explicitly higher than plausible
evidence.241 As the Supreme Court explained:
An inference of fraudulent intent may be plausible, yet less cogent
than other, nonculpable explanations for *PT VTST1Vo1*8+ W01V)W*e
To qualify as strong, . . . an inference of scienter must be more
than merely plausible or reasonable—it must be cogent and at least
as compelling as any opposing inference of non-fraudulent
intent.242

Compare the criminal process, where the grand jury which decides
on indictment, can be impaneled on mere suspicion.243 The Supreme Court
has explained that:
R91LOMT o W0),*f mP0+T N),O+VOW*O01 O+ .,TVOWo*TV ).01 o +.TWOSOW
Wo+T 0, W01*,0(T,+jf *PT Q,o1V N),j :Wo1 O1(T+*OQo*T 3T,TLj 01
suspicion that the law is being violated, or even because it wants
o++),o1WT *Po* O* O+ 10*e8< ^* 1TTV 10* OVT1*OSj *PT 0SST1VT, O*
+)+.TW*+f 0, T(T1 R*PT .,TWO+T 1o*),T 0S *PT 0SST1+T< O* O+
investigating. The grand jury requires no authorization from its
constituting court to initiate an investigation, nor does the
prosecutor require leave of court to seek a grand jury indictment.
And in its day-to-day functioning, the grand jury generally
operates without the interference of a presiding judge. 244

Thus, while the civil complaint at least requires a claim pleaded with
particularity—for example, stating the elements of a claim and alleging some
evidence for each element—the prosecutor in a criminal case can impanel a
grand jury merely on suspicion of some unknown wrongdoing.245 Suspicion
O+ Rq*pPT o..,TPT1+O01 0, O3oQO1o*O01 0S *PT TkO+*T1WT 0S +03T*PO1Q m,01Q
based only on inconclusive or slight evidence, or possibly even no
239.
Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 313.
240.
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, sec.
101(b), § 21D, 109 Stat. 737, 747 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4).
241.
Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 314.
242.
Id.
243.
United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 48 (1992).
244.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S.
292, 297 (1991); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919)).
245.
Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 314; Williams, 504 U.S. at 48.
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T(OVT1WTe<246 This is an explicitly lower threshold than the plausible
evidence required for a civil claim, even though it triggers the substantial
social cost of impaneling a grand jury.247
Next, in order to return an indictment, the grand jury must find
probable cause for further process.248 This standard was most recently
scrutinized when the Supreme Court of the United States held that a finding
of probable cause by a lay grand jury was sufficient to justify the forfeiture
0S o +)+.TW*8+ .,0.T,*jf T(T1 mPT1 +)WP S0,STO*),T m0)LV LO3O* *PT +)+.TW*8+
ability to hire a defense attorney.249 The Supreme Court characterizes
probable cause as a threshold lying between mere suspicion and prima facie
T(OVT1WTB R:q*pPT *T,3 probable cause . . . imports a seizure made under
circumstances which warrant +)+.OWO01e e e e e q^p* O+ WLTo, *Po* :01Lj *PT
probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the
+*o1Vo,V 0S .,0nonLT Wo)+Te8<250 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit characterizes
.,0nonLT Wo)+T Ro+ ,To+01onLT Q,0)1V+ S0, nTLOTSf +)..0,*TV nj LT++ *Po1
prima facie proof, but more than mere +)+.OWO01e<251 Since suspicion is
warranted even without any evidence, arguably any scintilla of evidence at
all could potentially suffice for a finding of probable cause, which would
secure an indictment and trigger further social costs.252
C.

Civil Discovery Versus Criminal Search and Seizure

In the civil context, the scope of discovery is governed by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which state:
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of
discovery is as follows: [p]arties may obtain discovery regarding
any non-priviLTQTV 3o**T, *Po* O+ ,TLT(o1* *0 o1j .o,*j8+ WLoO3 0,
defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the
importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in
W01*,0(T,+jf *PT .o,*OT+8 ,TLo*O(T oWWT++ *0 relevant information,
*PT .o,*OT+8 ,esources, the importance of the discovery in resolving
the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information within this

47U48.

246.
247.

Suspicion, BLACK8S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Williams, 504 U.S. at

248.
Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1097 (2014).
249.
See id. at 1095U97, 1105.
250.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 235 (1983) (quoting Locke v. United
States, 7 U.S. 339, 348 (1813); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969)).
251.
United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556, 562 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting
United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 392 (6th Cir. 1993)).
252.
See id. at 569.
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scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be
253
discoverable.

In the criminal context, searches and seizures are governed
by three successively weaker standards:254 Probable cause—familiar
from the grand jury indictment discussed above,255 reasonable
suspicion,256 and reasonable belief.257
@,0nonLT Wo)+T o* W,O3O1oL Lom O+ Rqop ,To+01onLT Q,0)1V *0 +)+.TW*
that a person has committed or is committing a crime, or that a place contains
+.TWOSOW O*T3+ W011TW*TV mO*P o W,O3Te<258 It is the evidentiary standard that
the police must meet to obtain a warrant for an arrest or to execute a search
of a person or property.259 The Court has explained that this standard
requires case-by-case balancing:
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not
capable of precise definition or mechanical application. In each
case, it requires a balancing of the need for the particular search
253.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
254.
See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 336
(2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968)e R6PT1 o1 0SSOWT, Po+ ,To+01onLT +)+.OWO01 *Po* o .,0no*O01T,
subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that
criminal conV)W* O+ 0WW),,O1Q *Po* o1 O1*,)+O01 01 *PT .,0no*O01T,8+ +OQ1OSOWo1*Lj VO3O1O+PTV
privacy interT+*+ O+ ,To+01onLTe< 91O*TV =*o*T+ (e [1OQP*+f GIH 9e=e KKJf KJK (2001).
255.
Tellabs, Inc., 551 U.S. at 336 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also discussion
supra Section III.B.
The probable cause standard is incapable of precise definition or
quantification into percentages because it deals with probabilities and depends on
*PT *0*oLO*j 0S *PT WO,W)3+*o1WT+e 6T Po(T +*o*TVf P0mT(T,f *Po* :q*pPT +)n+*o1WT 0S
oLL *PT VTSO1O*O01+ 0S .,0nonLT Wo)+T O+ o ,To+01onLT Q,0)1V S0, nTLOTS 0S Q)OL*f8 o1V
that the belief of guilt must be particularized with respect to the person to be
searched or seized.

Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
@,0nonLT Wo)+T RTkO+*q+p mPT,T *PT M10m1 SoW*+ o1V WO,W)3+*o1WT+ o,T +)SSOWOT1* *0 mo,,o1* o
man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
S0)1Ve< Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696 (citing Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175U76
(1949)).
256.
Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 696. Reasonable suspicion is a standard, more than a
hunch but considerably below preponderanWT 0S *PT T(OVT1WTf mPOWP N)+*OSOT+ o1 0SSOWT,8+
investigative stop of an individual upon the articulable and particularized belief that criminal
activity is afoot. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123U24 (2000).
257.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 28. Reasonableness is that point at which the
Q0(T,13T1*8+ O1*T,T+* oV(o1WTV nj o .o,*OW)Lo, +To,WP 0, +TOi),T 0)*mTOQP+ *PT L0++ 0S
O1VO(OV)oL .,O(oWj 0, S,TTV03 0S 30(T3T1* *Po* o**T1V+ *PT Q0(T,13T1*8+ oW*O01e ^LLO10O+ (e
Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 426U27 (2004).
258.
Probable Cause, BLACK LAW8S DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
259.
See id.
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against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.
Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the
manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it,
260
and the place in which it is conducted.

Both the civil proportionality standard and the probable cause
criminal standard are determined case-by-case.261 In each context, just as
important as the balancing requirement, is the institutional requirement that a
judge, rather than a plaintiff or police officer, conduct the balancing inquiry:
R[probable cause] protection consists in requiring that [necessary] inferences
be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate, instead of being judged by
the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
W,O3Te<262 These similarities suggest that discovery and criminal search and
seizure, face similar thresholds.263 However, note that the factors that
explicitly require balancing in the civil case are more extensive and explicit
than in the criminal one.264 In particular, the proportionality language in the
civil discovery context can require estimates for costs and benefits of a
particular discovery that are absent in the criminal context.265 This, and other
enumerated factors, suggest that the civil discovery threshold may be harder
to meet than criminal probable cause standard.266
The other two search standards in the criminal context are even
lower.267 The second standard that applies to criminal investigations is
R,To+01able suspicion, [which is a] particularized and objective basis,
supported by specific and articulable facts, for suspecting a person of
W,O3O1oL oW*O(O*je<268 It is the standard that a police officer must meet to
briefly detain, but not arrest, someone who is suspected of involvement in a
crime, or to frisk a person—the so-called Terry stop.269 The Supreme Court
explained the threshold as follows:
While reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than
probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than
260.
Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1526 (2012)
(quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)).
261.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), (2)(A); Bell, 441 U.S. at 559.
262.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
263.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1526; Johnson, 333
U.S. at 14.
264.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1526.
265.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Florence, 132 S. Ct. at 1526.
266.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); Probable Cause, supra note 258.
267.
See Evidentiary Standards and Burdens of Proof, supra note 43.
268.
Reasonable Suspicion, BLACK8S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
269.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26U27 (1968); see also Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119, 122 (2000).
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preponderance of the evidence, the Fourth Amendment requires at
least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.
;PT 0SSOWT, 3)+* nT onLT *0 o,*OW)Lo*T 30,T *Po1 o1 RO1WP0o*T and
270
unparticularized suspicion or hunch< 0S W,Ominal activity.

Thirdly, the reasonable belief standard applies when officers are
searching premises that they do not have clear authority—typically given by
a warrant pursuant to probable cause—to search.271 Police officers are
immune from suit so long as they search a location with the reasonable belief
that a suspect, or inculpating material, will be found there.272 The Supreme
!0),* Po+ PTLV *Po* *PO+ +*o1Vo,V .,0(OVT+ -)oLOSOTV O33)1O*j *0 RoLL n)* *PT
plainly incom.T*T1* 0, *P0+T mP0 M10mO1QLj (O0Lo*T *PT Lome<273 A year
later, the Court held that to overcome qualified immunity for an official who
Po+ oLLTQTVLj (O0Lo*TV o ,OQP*f Rq*pPT W01*0),+ 0S *PT ,OQP* 3)+* nT +)SSOWOT1*Lj
clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
(O0Lo*T+ *Po* ,OQP*e<274 At the circuit level, the Second Circuit has held that
the reasonable belief standard is lower than probable cause.275 The Tenth
Circuit has held the same.276

at 27).

270.

271.
mo,,o1*LT++ +To,WP
grounds).
272.
at 870U71.
273.
274.
275.

Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123U24 (citation omitted) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S.
Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 870U71, 880 (1987) (upholding
0S .,0no*O01T,8+ P0)+T nj .,0no*O01 0SSOWT, on basis of reasonable
United States v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 214 (2d Cir. 1995); Griffin, 483 U.S.
Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986).
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
See Lauter, 57 F.3d at 215.

Al*P0)QP mT oQ,TT mO*P *PT VO+*,OW* W0),*8+ )L*O3o*T W01WL)+O01f mT 10*T
*Po* O* o..LOTV *00 +*,O1QT1* o *T+* mPT1 O* PTLV *Po* R0SSOWT,+ 3oj .,0.T,Lj VT*T,3O1T
whether they have probable cause to believe that an apartment or house is the
o,,T+*TT8+ ,T+OVT1We, and if probable cause exists, they may enter such premises to
effect the arrest when they have a reasonable basis to believe that the arrestee will
nT .,T+T1*e< #+ 10*TV on0(Tf *PT .,0.T, O1-)O,j O+ mPT*PT, *PT,T O+ o reasonable
belief that the suspect resides at the place to be entered to execute an arrest warrant,
and whether the officers have reason to believe that the suspect is present.

Id. (citations omitted).
276.
See Valdez v. McPheters, 172 F.3d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 1990).

Only one circuit has suggested a higher knowledge standard [than
,To+01onLT nTLOTSp 01 *PT .o,* 0S Lom T1S0,WT3T1* 0SSOWT,+ qT1*T,O1Q o *PO,V .o,*j8+
residence to arrest a suspect]. In United States v. Harper, the Ninth Circuit
W01WL)VTV *Po* R*PT .0LOWT 3oj T1*T, o P03T mO*P an arrest warrant only if they
Po(T .,0nonLT Wo)+T *0 nTLOT(T *PT .T,+01 1o3TV O1 *PT mo,,o1* ,T+OVT+ *PT,Te<

Id. at 1224 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 896 (9th Cir.
1991)).
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Adversarial Process and Legal Representation

Although both criminal and civil litigants have rights to direct and
cross-examination, the government backed prosecutor has certain
advantages—in both experience and resources—that a private plaintiff may
lack.277 As mentioned earlier, private civil litigants have to pay their own
way, and insofar as the plaintiff must make her case before the defendant
responds, the plaintiff has to pay first; if the plaintiff does not have the legal
expertise to make a prima facie case, then the case is dismissed.278 This payto-play dynamic also provides a criminal prosecutor a potential advantage
over the civil plaintiff, as explained below.279
When private information is revealed through investigation,
discovery, or trial, the adversarial system provides for contentious vetting.280
Through confrontation and cross-examination, each side attempts to
minimize the weight of adverse evidence.281 Both civil and criminal litigants
have the opportunity to challenge information adduced by the other side.282
A criminal deST1Vo1* Po+ o W01+*O*)*O01oL ,OQP* R*0 nT W01S,01*TV mO*P *PT
mO*1T++T+ oQoO1+* PO3e<283 Although this right is not universal in civil
proWTTVO1Q+f *PT =).,T3T !0),* Po+ PTLV *Po* RqOp1 oL30+* T(T,j +T**O1Q
where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an
opportunity to confront and cross-Tko3O1T oV(T,+T mO*1T++T+e<284
In theory then, civil litigants are at a disadvantage to criminal ones in
persuading the judge on legal issues.285 The prosecutor has a budget and a
team of experienced attorneys to pursue any case, and the criminal defendant
3)+* RPo(T *PT #++O+*o1WT 0S !0)1+TL S0, PO+ VTST1q+pTe<286 There is no
analogue for this right in civil cases.287 There has been support for extending
the right to counsel to at least some civil cases.288 For example, an American
"o, #++0WOo*O01 ,T+0L)*O01 WoLL+ S0, Tk*T1VO1Q *PT ,OQP* *0 RL0m O1W03T
277.
Posner, supra note 5, at 1505; see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
278.
Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 35, at 102U05; see also FED. R. CIV. P.
8(a), 12(b)(6).
279.
See Posner, supra note 5, at 1505.
280.
See id. at 1490U91.
281.
See id. at 1490.
282.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Dubreuil v. Witt, 781 A.2d 503, 508 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2001); Posner, supra note 5, 1490.
283.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
284.
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970).
285.
See Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 35, at 92U93.
286.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 35, at
92U93.
287.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
288.
See HOWARD H. DANA, JR., TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIV. JUST., REPORT
TO THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES 1 (2006); Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 35, at 151U52.
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persons in those categories of adversarial proceedings where basic human
needs are at stake, such as those involving shelter, sustenance, safety, health,
0, WPOLV W)+*0Vje<289 In a comparative context, the European Court of
Human Rights has held that the right to counsel exists in cases where
absence of counsel would result in cosmetic rights—mPOWP o,T R*PT0,T*OWoL
or illusory [rather than] practical and efSTW*O(Te<290 However, even if this
right were extended to civil defendants, it would not help the private plaintiff
who, unlike the criminal prosecutor, would still have to pay her way or
proceed pro se.291 While wealthy civil litigants can afford good legal
representation, those with limited means have to proceed pro se, and are less
likely to make legal arguments that would convince a judge.292 Legal aid
organizations and firms can lessen this disparity by offering pro bono
representation, and judges can be more permissive in hearing pro se litigants,
but these remedial measures are a far cry from the constitutional guarantee to
representation in criminal cases or the experienced and publicly funded
resources of a prosecu*0,8+ 0SSOWTe293
This difference in the guarantee of legal representation has two
potential effects.294 aO,+*f O* Wo1 O1W,To+T *PT VO(T,QT1WT O1 *PT LO*OQo1*+8
private information, noted in the previous part.295 When both sides are
assured legal representation, the legal rules, tests, and practices are familiar
to their lawyers, and are therefore common information.296 Only the factual,
as opposed to legal, information is private in the criminal case.297 However,
in the civil case, neither side has a right to legal representation.298 This may
result in a divergence of legal information that compounds the divergence in
private factual information.299 Moreover, where litigants are less versed in
the skills of direct and cross-examination, divergences in factual—as
opposed to legal—beliefs are also likelier to persist.300 Second, if potential
litigants are dissuaded by the cost of litigation, then the absence of a right to
289.
DANA, supra note 288, at 1.
290.
Airey v. Ireland, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 305, 314 (1979).
291.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 62 n.11; FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at
286; Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 35, at 92U93.
292.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 62 n.11; FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at
286.
293.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 62 n.11;
Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 35, at 92.
294.
See Kuckes, supra note 204, at 18; Summers, supra note 53, at 498U99.
295.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 383, 393.
296.
See id. at 62, 393; Summers, supra note 53, at 502, 504, 506.
297.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 393.
298.
See Kuckes, supra note 204, at 3, 8, 18.
299.
See Summers, supra note 53, at 499U500.
300.
See id. at 499.
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counsel in civil cases can skew civil litigation to the side of the well-heeled,
whether plaintiffs or defendants, and the precedents emanating from the
litigation of the rich may not be appropriate for regulating society as a
whole.301 In particular, many self-help options that are available to rich
parties—such as alternative arrangements in case of a contract breach or selfinsurance in case of a tort—are sometimes taken for granted in law.302 Yet,
these options can involve search and transaction costs that only the affluent
can afford.303
If the guarantee of legal counsel is an advantage for the criminal
defendant, then the nature of her adversary is a countervailing
disadvantage.304 Criminal defendants are prosecuted by the government,
whereas civil defendants are often sued by private parties—though
government agencies also bring civil suits, in which case this difference is
erased.305 Four distinctions follow from this point: first, the prosecutor has
resources—particularly her relationships with law enforcement and the
judiciary—that a private litigant does not, and this can create a power
imbalance in the criminal case that, even if sometimes present, is not as stark
in civil litigation.306 =TW01Vf *PT W,O3O1oL .,0+TW)*0,8+ 0SSOWT O+ 30,T
experienced in criminal litigation than the typical civil plaintiff.307 Third, the
prosecutor does not use her own private resources in litigation, whereas a
civil plaintiff typically bears her costs, unless the court redistributes these
costs after litigation.308 Fourth, the prosecutor is likelier to have political
ambitions and pressures that affect her calculus in ways that are inapplicable
to the typical civil plaintiff.309

35, at 92.

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

See Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 35, at 101U04.
Id. at 91U92, 103, 120.
Id. at 90U91.
See Kuckes, supra note 204, at 18 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI).
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 288U89; Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note

306.
Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 35, at 91U92.
307.
Radek Gadek, Prosecutor Career, Salary and Training Info, CRIM. JUST.
DEGREE, C., & CAREER BLOG, http://www.criminaljusticeonlineblog.com/prosecutor-career/
(last updated Jan. 17, 2016).
308.
COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 400; Posner, supra note 5, at 1505;
Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 35, at 102U105.
309.
Jed Shugerman, @*he ,ise of the -rosec1tor -oPiticians/Q Data9ase of
Prosecutorial Experience for Justices, Circuit Judges, Governors, AGs, and Senators, 1880D
2017, SHUGERBLOG (July 7, 2017), http://www.shugerblog.com/2017/07/07/the-rise-of-theprosecutor-politicians-database-of-prosecutorial-experience-for-justices-circuit-judgesgovernors-ags-and-senators-1880-2017/.
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POSSIBLE REASONS FOR THE DIFFERENCES IN CRIMINAL AND CIVIL
PROTECTION

Six possible reasons for this divergence are: (1) frivolous civil
litigation may be a greater—costlier—problem than frivolous criminal
litigation, since the former is brought by private parties that do not
internalize costs, whereas the latter is brought by the government;310 (2)
courts offer greater leeway for criminal investigators to pursue leads in light
of their institutional importance and experience;311 (3) Miranda,312
Massiah,313 and related constitutional rights may make it difficult for
criminal investigators to establish a substantial probability of guilt pretrial;314 (4) the harm from letting a criminal off may be greater than the harm
from letting a civil wrongdoer off;315 (5) the social value of a spectacle—
public trial—may justify the trial even when the probability of guilt is
relatively low;316 and (6) the prosecutor may have private incentives for good
behavior, or fewer incentives for bad behavior, than the civil plaintiff.317
;PT SO,+* .0*T1*OoL ,o*O01oLT V03O1o*TV *PT !0),*8+ ,To+01O1Q O1
raising the standard for civil complaints to plausible evidence.318 Twombly
and Iqbal mT,T VTWOVTV O1 JccE o1V JccCf ,T+.TW*O(TLjf o1V WO(OL RWo+TL0oV+
have declined 21% since reaching an apex of 19.5 million cases in 2009—an
average of about -IeG2 .T, jTo,e<319 This coincidence does not establish
causation since the 2008 recession would have contributed in ways unrelated
*0 *PT WPo1QTV .LToVO1Q +*o1Vo,V& 1T(T,*PTLT++f +03T RT3.Orical studies have
found that Twombly and Iqbal have increased the likelihood that motions to
dismiss would be granted—at least for particular kinds of casT+e<320
310.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 286U87, 289; Evans, supra note 218, at 3.
311.
See Kuckes, supra note 204, at 21U22; Gadek, supra note 307.
312.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
313.
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964).
314.
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964).
315.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 457U58.
316.
See Mueller, supra note 20, at 6U7, 11.
317.
See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 27, at 287U89; Rosen-Zvi &
Fisher, supra note 35, at 99.
318.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 556U57 (2007); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
319.
COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS,
EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: AN OVERVIEW OF 2015 STATE COURT CASELOADS 4
(2016),
http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/CSP/EWSC%202015.ashx;
see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 666; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548.
320.
Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s
Impact on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 603, 603 (2012); Reinert, supra note 39, at
2143U44; Adam N. Steinman, The End of an Era? Federal Civil Procedure After the 2015
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Whether this over-litigation problem is real is an enduring point of
contention.321 For present purposes, though, we are interested in whether
frivolous civil litigation is likelier than frivolous prosecution.322 That
impression perhaps rests on the assumption that criminal prosecutors
internalize social costs and benefit better than civil plaintiffs do.323
However, this is far from obvious for at least two reasons: first, if frivolous
litigation is understood to mean litigation that is unlikely to be successful, or
litigation that unduly vexes the defendant, then a great deal of criminal
litigation appears frivolous as well.324 Prosecutorial caseloads that stretch far
beyond their abilities are vexatious simply because the cases are unlikely to
be tried responsibly.325 Second, even if caseloads were lower, it is unclear
that prosecutors internalize the public expenses of the investigation, the trial,
or subsequent process, such as incarceration or parole; it is likewise unclear
that prosecutors consider any public benefit beyond the benefits to their
office of winning the trial or securing a guilty plea.326 It may be countered
that in jurisdictions where prosecutors are elected or otherwise politicized,
they consider social costs and benefits in roughly the same way that
politicians do.327 However, the extent to which politicians do so is itself
questionable; prosecutors, like politicians, may well lean toward important
interest groups, such as law enforcement and wealthy constituents.328 The
cost benefit analyses of these interest groups need not mirror the social
calculus.329
A second possible rationale is institutional—low pre-trial criminal
*P,T+P0LV+ 3oj ,TSLTW* *PT N)VOWOo,j8+ VTST,T1WT *0 *PT Tk.T,*O+T o1V
institu*O01oL ,0LT+ 0S *PT .0LOWT o1V *PT .,0+TW)*0,8+ 0SSOWTe330 The police and
Amendments, 66 EMORY L.J. 1, 16 (2016) (citing Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s
Aeas1reQ 4n 4ssess8ent of the Me$eraP F1$iciaP 2enter’s +t1$J of Aotions to Dis8iss, 6 FED.
CTS. L. REV. 1, 12 (2012); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 666; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 548; COURT
STATISTICS PROJECT, supra note 319, at 4.
321.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, 587; see also Evans, supra note 218, at 3.
322.
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557U59; FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 287.
323.
See FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 287U88; Gershowitz & Killinger, supra
note 27, at 262U65.
324.
See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 27, at 263U64.
325.
Id. at 263.
326.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 287U88; Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note
27, at 264.
327.
See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 27, at 277.
328.
See id.; D4’s; -rosec1tors; F1$"es 2ontin1e to Mee$ the -oPice 3r1taPitJ
Beast, supra note 118.
329.
See RANDALL G. SHELDEN, CTR. ON JUVENILE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
INTEREST GROUPS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY 3U4 (2011).
330.
See Kuckes, supra note 204, at 22; Leong, supra note 5, at 2476U77, 2477
n.69.
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criminal prosecutor have valuable experience in pursuing criminal matters.331
Moreover, these two organs of the government have public mandates to act
within their domains just as the judiciary does.332 These institutional
concerns—respect for expertise and political legitimacy—may dissuade
courts from imposing demanding thresholds in the criminal case.333 The only
civil cases where such institutional concerns limit courts are cases where the
government is a party, typically as either an executive agency or a
legislature.334 In these cases, courts are likewise deferential to the state,
albeit under different doctrines: Chevron deference335 and rational basis
review, respectively.336
A third possibility is that some of the enumerated constitutional
restrictions on criminal inquiries so hamper the investigators as to make
higher pre-trial thresholds fatal to the prosecution.337 Civil investigators can
obtain evidence from their adversaries through discovery, whereas criminal
investiQo*0,+ o,T Po3.T,TV nj *PT VTST1Vo1*8+ ,OQP*+ *0 o1 o**0,1Tj o1V
against self-incrimination,338 among others.339 Such restrictions would limit
the criminal investigator at the trial stage, and the lower pre-trial thresholds
may compensate for this disadvantage.340 The trouble with this reasoning,
however, is the constitutional suggestion that criminal investigations should
face higher hurdles than civil ones because of the notoriety and severity of
criminal sanctions and the public expense of criminal trials.341 If the lower
thresholds compensate for higher constitutional protections, then the
constitutional safeguards of criminal defendants have essentially been
annihilated by other means.342
331.
See Amici Curiae Brief of Former Federal Prosecutors et al. in Support of
the Petitioner, supra note 80, at 16.
332.
See id.; Leong, supra note 5, at 2477 n.69.
333.
Amici Curiae Brief of Former Federal Prosecutors et al. in Support of the
Petitioner, supra note 80, at 16; see also Kuckes, supra note 204, at 22U23.
334.
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
865U66 (1984).
335.
See id. at 866.
336.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 467 U.S. at 866; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
631U32 (1996).
337.
See U.S. CONST. amends. IVUVII; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474
(1966).
338.
U.S. CONST. amends. VUVI; FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
339.
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
340.
See Kuckes, supra note 204, at 22; Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman,
Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L.
REV. 839, 917U18 (1996).
341.
See NAT8L CTR. OF VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 10, 4U5; Rosen-Zvi &
Fisher, supra note 35, at 82.
342.
See NAT8L CTR. OF VICTIMS OF CRIME, supra note 10, 4U5; Rosen-Zvi &
Fisher, supra note 35, at 82.
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The fourth rationale is similarly questionable; the stigma associated
with criminal behavior is obvious—evidenced by such literary tropes as
scarlet letters and such contemporary practices as sex offender registries.343
;PT 3TVOo8+ 0n+T++O01 mO*P W,O3Tf n0*P ,ToL LOST o1V SOW*O*O0)+f 1),*),T+ *PO+
notoriety.344 The criminal wrong tends to generate more interest and
coverage than the civil wrong.345 In light of these trends, it is arguable that
the state is more reluctant to terminate a criminal investigation than a civil
one, for fear that it may face special opprobrium for any failure in catching
criminals.346 Tough on crime slogans, law and order candidates are meant to
signal commitments to the aggressive prosecution of crimes.347 Such an
aggressive approach may encourage the setting of low thresholds for
criminal investigations.348 The state may wish to thereby err on the side of
over-deterrence in crime.349 However, this argument appears to suffer from
the same problem as the last—it appears to disregard, or nullify, the
constitutional protections that appear to privilege criminal defendants over
civil ones.350 Insofar as constitutional rights, which are meant to provide a
measure of counter-majoritarian security to the vulnerable, this rationale, like
the last, appears to directly undermine constitutional intent.351

343.
Carolyn E. Frazier, *o$aJ’s +carPet Cetter B the Sex Offender Registry B
Is Risky Justice for the Youth, CHI. TRIB.: COMMENT. (May 26, 2017, 1:31 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-sex-offenders-list-teens-riskperspec-0529-md-20170526-story.html.
344.
IAN MARSH & GAYNOR MELVILLE, CRIME, JUSTICE AND THE MEDIA 1U2
(2009).
345.
See id.; Marc Galanter & Angela Frozena, The Continuing Decline of
Civil Trials in American Courts, POUND CIV. JUST. INST. 2 (2011),
http://www.poundinstitute.org/sites/default/files/docs/2011%20judges%20forum%20Galanter
-Frozena%20Paper.pdf.
346.
See The Role of Pressure Groups, EVERYONE8S PARLIAMENT,
http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/documents/explore/education/factsheets/factsheet_8.4_Pres
sureGroups.pdf (last updated July 2015); Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 27, at 287.
347.
KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN POLITICS 3 (1997); David Alan Sklansky, The Problems with
Prosecutors, ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 451, 455 (2018). Rq@p)nLOW 0.O1O01 .0LL+ O1VOWo*T *Po*
members of the public have become more likely to support punitive policies such as the death
penalty and three strike +T1*T1WO1Q Lom+e< BECKETT, supra, at 3.
348.
See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 27, at 263; Sklansky, supra note
347, at 456.
349.
Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 35, at 89U90.
350.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Kuckes, supra note 204, at 14; Gershowitz &
Killinger, supra note 27, at 263.
351.
See Michael C. Dorf, The Majoritarian Difficulty and Theories of
Constitutional Decision Making, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 283, 285 (2010).
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The fifth explanation focuses squarely on the political functions of
litigation.352 The public nature of the criminal trial gives it a communicative,
perhaps even theatrical, character that the typical civil trial lacks.353 The
Constitution itself is uniquely political among other legal sources, insofar as
much of it speaks in vague platitudes, rather than detailed rules.354
Therefore, it stands to reason that the main stage, where constitutional
restrictions are applied, would be the most public phase of lawmaking—the
criminal trial before a jury of peers.355 Protections at earlier stages are
relatively invisible to the public and do not serve the purpose of
W033)1OWo*O1Q *PT Q0(T,13T1*8+ W01+*O*)*O01oL W033O*3T1*+ o+ mTLL o+ *PT
trial does.356 Highlighting these protections at the trial stage, rather than at
the pre-trial stage, affords the criminal defendant protections at the time that
he is most visible to the polity.357 This explanation, however, is only partial;
it may offer an account for why criminal trials have higher thresholds than
civil ones, but it does not tell us why pre-trial civil protections should be
higher than the corresponding criminal ones.358
A sixth rationale for the disjunction between criminal and civil
O1(T+*OQo*O01+ O+ *PT VO+*O1W*O01f 10* nT*mTT1 *PT .,0+TW)*0,8+ .),.0,*TVLj
pubLOW o1V *PT WO(OL .LoO1*OSS8+ .,O(o*T 30*O(T+f n)* nT*mTT1 *PT .TW)LOo,
purely private motives of the two.359 Winning cases may not be as important
to the civil plaintiff as the prosecutor.360 The civil plaintiff may push for
further investigation merely to intimidate the defendant, or potential future
defendants, or to hold out for a high settlement.361 The prosecutor, on the
other hand, builds her reputation on successful trials and statistics such as the
percentage of cases argued and won.362 These reputational concerns may
352.
See Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 35, at 117 & n.127, 118.
353.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Kristin D. Brudy & Norman Finkel, The
Drama of the Courtroom: Media Effects on American Culture and Law (Mar. 31, 2016)
(unpublished Psychology Honors Thesis, Georgetown University) (on file with Georgetown
University).
354.
Howard Kaplan, Constitution as Legal Document, INSIGHTS ON L. &
SOC8Y, Spring 2015, at 2, 3; Benjamin David Steele, The Vague and Ambiguous US
Constitution,
MARMALADE
(Dec.
1,
2015),
http://www.benjamindavidsteele.wordpress.com/2015/12/01/the-vague-and-ambiguous-usconstitution/.
355.
See Kuckes, supra note 204, at 17; Mueller, supra note 20, at 5U6;
Difference Between Grand Jury and Trial Jury, supra note 103.
356.
See Kuckes, supra note 204, at 21.
357.
See id. at 21U22.
358.
See id. at 24 n.132.
359.
Posner, supra note 5, at 1486, 1505.
360.
See id. at 1505.
361.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at 286; Posner, supra note 5, at 1490.
362.
See Posner, supra note 5, at 1505.
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give the prosecutor a strong private incentive to quickly drop cases that are
unlikely to be won at trial and to focus resources on those cases that would
survive the high constitutional thresholds in court.363 If this is right, then it
would also provide prosecutors an incentive for farsightedness—a strong
interest in predicting eventual trial outcomes early in the process and in
terminating investigations that are unlikely to bear fruit.364 However, an
expectation of such foresight seems misplaced in light of the overwhelming
caseloads that prosecutors appear to carry.365
V.

CONCLUSION

Taken in isolation, neither the clamp down on civil litigation, nor the
expansion of criminal litigation seems surprising. * Too many civil cases do
impose a great cost on society, as does crime.366 However, taken together,
they appear to pose a paradox.367 The civil system is, in many cases, a
cheaper substitute for criminal prosecutions.368 We would, therefore, expect
that over time, criminal prosecutions would decline and civil litigation would
increase, as claims migrate from the former regime to the latter.369 Yet, the
trend we observe seems to be the exact opposite.370
To hazard a speculation, the reason for this puzzling evolution may
be pressure from the powerful stakeholders in the criminal and civil systems:
law enforcement, politicians, prosecutors in the former, and powerful private
institutions in the latter.371 Legal devices evolve under the pressure of
interest groups, even when the views of such groups are questionable.372 The
loosening of protections for criminal defendants likely arose from the steady

56.

363.
364.

See id.; Sklansky, supra note 347, 455U56.
See Posner, supra note 5, at 1505; Sklansky, supra note 347, at 453, 455U

365.
See MANN, supra note 35; Sklansky, supra note 347, at 455.
366.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 385, 457U58, 460; What Are
@2osts/ in a 2i0iP CaNs1it6, LAWYERS.COM, http://www.lawyers.com/legalinfo/research/court-costs-in-civil-lawsuits.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2018).
367.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 403U04; MANN, supra note 35.
368.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 397, 400; MANN, supra note 35.
369.
See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 2, at 443; FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, at
286; Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 35, at 92U93.
370.
See COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, supra note 319, at 2, 4, 11; Galanter &
Frozena, supra note 343, at 3, 6; John Gramlich, Federal Criminal Prosecutions Fall to
Lowest Level in Nearly Two Decades, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 28, 2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/28/federal-criminal-prosecutions-fall-tolowest-level-in-nearly-two-decades/.
371.
Sklansky, supra note 347, at 453U54, 463; The Role of Pressure Groups,
supra note 346.
372.
The Role of Pressure Groups, supra note 346.
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public and political pressure for a tougher stance on crime, greater support
for the police and prosecutors, and more penalties for criminal offenders.373
On the other hand, the extension in protections for civil defendants
was likely a response to pressure for lower damage awards, stronger
firewalls against vexatious lawsuits, and a lower caseload for courts.374
Ironically, the reasons for increasing protections on the civil side can, with
minor changes, be applied to criminal cases as well, while the reasons for
decreasing criminal protections can likewise be applied to the civil system.375
If the civil system is bloated, then so too is the criminal one.376 If there is a
need to reduce criminal wrongs, there is also a need to reduce civil ones.377
The opposite pressures observed on the civil and criminal systems seem to
stem not from a principled distinction between the two, but rather from the
contrasting views of the dominant interest groups in play.378
The Constitution also seems to press for the opposite trend; since
many protections were created explicitly for the criminal defendant, and not
the civil one, absent doctrinal evolution, we would have expected litigation
to migrate from the criminal system to the civil one over time.379 The
criminal caseload would decline, while the civil caseload would increase.380
Insofar as the criminal system involves greater deadweight losses, by
incarcerating wrongdoers, and thereby removing them from the economy
than the civil one, which only redistributes wealth—this constitutional result
may have been a welcome development.381 However, the evolution of legal
doctrine sketched in this Article shows that such a result never
materialized.382 Instead, the criminal system continues to grow, while civil
litigation is slowing down.383 This state of affairs seems irreversible at this
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point, but it appears, both constitutionally and pragmatically, to be a perverse
result.384

215, at 2.
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